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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs allege that provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2009 (the “Act”) are outside of Congress‟ delegated powers under the
United States Constitution, and violate the First, Fifth and Tenth Amendments and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b).
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 28 U.S.C. §1343.
Plaintiffs appeal from a final judgment dismissing all causes of action of the
Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
in which the district court reached the merits of the case. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The final judgment was entered on
November 30, 2010 and Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on December 1, 2010.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate

a private citizen‟s inactivity in commerce (a decision not to purchase health
insurance and to otherwise privately manage her own healthcare) and force said
citizen to participate in commerce by mandating that she purchase a particular kind
of health insurance approved by the federal government or pay a penalty for
noncompliance.
2.

Whether Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to mandate

that employers offer employees a particular level of health insurance coverage
1
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approved by the government at a price the government determines to be affordable
or pay a penalty for noncompliance.
3.

Whether Plaintiffs‟ right to free exercise of religion under the First

Amendment is violated when Congress mandates that citizens purchase health
insurance with mandated coverage provisions that conflict with their sincerely held
religious beliefs or pay a penalty, while simultaneously exempting others from the
same requirement because of their religious opposition.
4.

Whether Plaintiffs‟ right to free exercise of religion under the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act is violated when Congress mandates that citizens
purchase health insurance with mandated coverage provisions that conflict with
their sincerely held religious beliefs or pay a penalty, while simultaneously
exempting others from the same requirement because of their religious opposition.
5.

Whether Congress violates the Establishment Clause by exempting

members of certain religious sects from mandated health insurance but not
exempting other members of different religious sects solely because they do not
belong to or adhere to the tenets of the preferred religious sect.
6.

Whether Congress violates the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause

by exempting members of certain religious sects from mandated health insurance
but not exempting other members of different religious sects solely because they
do not belong to or adhere to the tenets of the preferred religious sect.
2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs oppose Congress‟ unprecedented attempt to force private citizens
who have decided not to participate in commerce to engage in commerce by
mandating that they purchase a particular kind of health insurance approved by the
federal government or pay a penalty. Plaintiffs also oppose Congress‟
unprecedented attempt to force employers to provide a particular level of health
insurance coverage to all their employees under threat of sanction. Plaintiffs
challenge provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (the “Act”) as exceeding Congress‟
delegated powers under Article I, § 8 and violative of Plaintiffs‟ constitutional and
statutory rights. Plaintiffs challenge §§ 1501 and 1513 of the Act, which establish
the “individual mandate” and the “employer mandate.” The individual mandate
dictates that, with limited exceptions, all citizens obtain health insurance coverage
that encompasses what the government determines to be “minimum essential
coverage” or pay significant penalties. Section 1501, 26 U.S.C. §5000A. The
employer mandate dictates that, with limited exceptions, employers provide
employees with health insurance coverage that meets what the government
determines to be “minimum essential coverage” at what the government
determines is affordable or pay significant penalties. Section 1513, 26 U.S.C.
§4980H.
3
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On the day that the Act became law, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiffs alleged, inter
alia, that the individual and employer mandates exceed Congress‟ delegated
powers under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution, violate Plaintiffs‟ rights to free
exercise of religion under the First Amendment and RFRA, free speech and free
association rights under the First Amendment, the Establishment Clause, the Equal
Protection under the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, the Guarantee
Clause, and provisions against direct or capitation taxes.
Defendants brought motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendants argued that Plaintiffs lacked standing,
that their claims were not ripe, and that their claims were barred as improper
challenges to tax collection under the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. §7421.
Defendants further argued that Plaintiffs could not state valid claims on the merits
because the individual and employer mandate provisions were valid exercises of
Congress‟ powers under Article I, § 8. Defendants also argued that Plaintiffs could
not state valid claims for violation of their other constitutional and statutory rights.
The district court found that Plaintiffs Kathy Byron, Jeff Helgeson and Dr.
David Stein did not have standing, but found that the remaining plaintiffs, Liberty
University (“Liberty”), Michele Waddell and Joanne Merrill, had standing. (“Joint
Appendix,” JA 0158). Only Liberty, Miss Waddell and Mrs. Merrill are appealing
4
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the district court‟s action. On the ripeness issue, the district court found that “the
challenged provisions create a direct and immediate dilemma, forcing Plaintiffs to
choose between extensively reorganizing their financial affairs before the
provisions go into effect, or risking civil penalties, and, thus, Plaintiffs‟ suit was
not premature. (JA 0159). The Anti-Injunction Act did not bar Plaintiffs‟ claims
because the penalties imposed upon citizens who do not obtain the required health
insurance coverage are regulatory penalties, not taxes. (JA 0164).
The court then reached the merits of all of Plaintiffs‟ claims and dismissed
them. The court concluded that “Congress acted in accordance with its
constitutionally delegated powers under the Commerce Clause when it passed the
employer and individual coverage provisions of the Act.” (JA 0164). Adopting an
expansive definition of the Commerce Clause, the court held that “decisions to pay
for health care without insurance are economic activities.” (JA 0171). “I hold that
there is a rational basis for Congress to conclude that individuals‟ decisions about
how and when to pay for health care are activities that in the aggregate
substantially affect the interstate health care market.” (JA 0170). “The conduct
regulated by the individual coverage provision is also within the scope of
Congress‟ powers under the Commerce Clause because it is rational to believe the
failure to regulate the uninsured would undercut the Act‟s larger regulatory scheme
for the interstate health care market.” (JA 0172). The court held that the employer
5
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mandate provision was a logical extension of Congress‟ power to regulate the
terms and conditions of employment, exemplified in the wage and hour standards
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and similar federal laws. (JA 0173). The court
reasoned that “the opportunity provided to an employee to enroll in an employersponsored health care plan is a valuable benefit offered in exchange for the
employee‟s labor, much like a wage or salary,” and from that proposition reasoned
that it is rational for Congress to mandate that employers provide such insurance
coverage to employees. (JA 0174).
The court relied upon its conclusion that the Act was a valid exercise of
Congress‟ Commerce Clause power to find that Plaintiffs could not state claims
under the Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause. (JA 0175, 0196). The court
also dismissed Plaintiffs‟ claims under the First and Fifth Amendments and under
RFRA. (JA 0177-0195).
After Plaintiffs filed this appeal, Judge Hudson of the Eastern District of
Virginia entered summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth of Virginia,
reaching the opposite conclusion on the merits to that reached by Judge Moon.
Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, Civil Action No. 3:10cv188-HEH, Eastern
District of Virginia, 2010 WL 5059718 (ED Va. December 13, 2010). Judge
Hudson concluded that the individual mandate exceeded Congress‟ constitutional

6
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authority. The Commonwealth‟s case addressed only the individual mandate, not
the employer mandate or other constitutional issues Plaintiffs have raised here.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Congress is seeking to extend its power far beyond any prior precedent by
requiring that, with few exceptions, all individuals and all employers of 50 or more
people obtain and maintain what is termed (but not defined) “minimum essential
coverage” for themselves and/or their employees. Sections 1501, 1513, 26 U.S.C.
§§5000A, 4980H. Section 1501 forces individuals who manage their healthcare
privately and do not participate in the commercial insurance market to participate
in commerce by obtaining “minimum essential coverage” or paying a penalty. 26
U.S.C. §5000A. Section 1513 compels employers to participate in commerce by
obtaining “minimum essential coverage” for their employees or paying a penalty.
26 U.S.C. §4980H.
Congress has not defined “minimum essential coverage,” except to say that
it must at least include ambulatory patient services, emergency services,
hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance use
disorder services, including behavioral health treatment, prescription drug
coverage, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, laboratory services,
preventive and wellness services, chronic disease management and

pediatric

services, including oral and vision care. Section 1302, 42 U.S.C. §18022(b). The
7
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precise definition is left to the discretion of the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”). Id.
Individuals who do not qualify for one of four exceptions and do not have
“minimum essential coverage” by January 1, 2014 will be subject to a graduated
annual penalty payable as part of their income tax return. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b),
(c). The only people exempted from the mandated health insurance (met through
either private insurance or federal programs such as Medicaid and Medicare) are
those who are incarcerated, not legally present in the country, or who qualify under
two limited “religious exemptions.” 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d). The “religious
exemptions” encompass only (1) members of religious sects which have been in
existence continually since December 31, 1950 and have conscientious objections
to acceptance of public or private health insurance or retirement benefits, and (2)
members of “healthcare sharing ministries,” defined as 501(c)(3) organizations in
existence since December 31, 1999, which share a common set of ethical or
religious beliefs and share medical expenses among members in accordance with
those beliefs. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d)(2). Employers which do not offer “minimum
essential coverage” to their employees as of January 1, 2014 will pay a penalty
equal to $2,000 per employee per year if any employee purchases alternative
coverage and receives a federal tax subsidy. 26 U.S.C. §4980H(a). Even if an
employer offers “minimum essential coverage” to its employees it can still be
8
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subject to a penalty of $3,000 per employee per year if the coverage is not deemed
“affordable” under the Act, i.e., if any employee receives a federal insurance
premium subsidy. 26 U.S.C. §4980H(b).
The individual and employer mandates are only a small part of the 2,000+
page Act which makes comprehensive and fundamental changes to the health care
and health insurance industries, creates a myriad of new federal bureaucracies and
institutes new taxes and penalties. Among the other provisions of the Act is a
requirement that all states establish American Health Benefit Exchanges, which are
government agencies or non-profit entities created by the state to make “qualified
health plans” available to “qualified individuals and employers.” Section 1311, 42
U.S.C. §18031. If states do not demonstrate that they will have exchanges in place
by January 1, 2014 and that those exchanges will meet the federal standards, then
the HHS Secretary will establish and operate exchanges in those states. Section
1321, 42 U.S.C. §18041. States may, but are not required to, prohibit abortion
coverage in “qualified health plans” offered through exchanges, but can only
prohibit abortion coverage by enacting a law that is subject to repeal at any time.
Section 1302, 42 U.S.C. §18022.
Liberty is a private Christian university which employs approximately 3,900
full-time and 1,242 part-time workers. (JA 0018). Approximately 4,340 people are
covered by various healthcare reimbursement options in which 1,879 Liberty
9
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employees have chosen to participate. (JA 0018). Liberty offers healthcare
reimbursement options that provide the type and level of services that are
appropriate to its employees‟ personal and financial situations and are consistent
with Liberty‟s and its employees‟ Christian values. (JA 0018-0019). The Act
requires Liberty to have in place no later than January 1, 2014 health insurance
plans that offer what the government will define as “minimum essential coverage,”
regardless of whether such coverage provides health care services that are
necessary or desirable for Liberty‟s employees, affordable for Liberty or its
employees or compatible with Liberty and its employees‟ Christian values. (JA
0018-0019). Although Liberty already offers health insurance benefits for its fulltime employees, it will nevertheless assuredly face significant penalties under the
Act. (JA 0027). Neither Liberty nor its employees can opt out of unnecessary or
unwanted medical procedures, including procedures that violate their sincerely
held religious beliefs. (JA 0029-0030). Liberty faces significant financial hardship
from having to either adjust its health care benefits or pay penalties. (JA 0027).
Miss Waddell and Mrs. Merrill have voluntarily and deliberately decided not
to purchase health insurance, but to instead save for and privately manage their
health care. (JA 0019-0021). They are Christians who believe in living out their
sincerely held religious beliefs in everyday life, including in the lifestyle choices
they make, of which managing their health care privately is but one example. (JA
10
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0029-0030). Because of the individual mandate provisions, Miss Waddell and Mrs.
Merrill are faced with either paying for “minimum essential coverage” that is
unnecessary and undesirable or paying penalties. (JA 0029-0030). When the
provision becomes fully effective on January 1, 2014, Plaintiffs will be required to
have in place insurance defined as offering “minimum essential coverage” by the
government, with no ability to opt out of procedures which violate their sincerely
held religious beliefs, or paying a significant annual penalty. (JA 0029-0030).
Plaintiffs therefore face the Hobson‟s choice of paying a penalty or paying for
something that collides with their sincerely held religious beliefs. (JA 0029-0030).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The irresolvable dilemmas posed by the individual and employer mandates
coupled with the unprecedented expansion of the Commerce Clause to forcibly
reverse personal decisions to not participate in commerce create real and
substantial threats not only to Plaintiffs‟ constitutional rights, but to the liberty of
all Americans. The district court reached far beyond the outermost boundary of the
Supreme Court‟s Commerce Clause precedents and crafted an expansive definition
of congressional power that, if permitted to stand, will create an unconstitutional
national police power that would threaten all aspects of American life. The district
court‟s willingness to expand the Commerce Clause as Congress suggested
threatens not only Plaintiffs‟ constitutional rights, but the bedrock concepts of
11
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federalism and individual freedom upon which the nation was founded. The
Founders explicitly withheld a national police power from Congress, reserving that
power to the states and the people under the Tenth Amendment. United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected
Congress‟ attempts to assume such power, id., and the district court should have
done so here. None of the cases cited by the district court change that conclusion or
justify the sweeping re-definition of congressional power necessary to justify the
individual and employer mandates.
Neither can the mandates be justified as valid exercises of Congress‟ power
under the Necessary and Proper or General Welfare clauses. Those clauses do not
provide Congress with carte blanche to enact laws that are otherwise outside of
their enumerated powers. United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1970 (2010)
(Alito, J., concurring). Rather than enacting a law in furtherance of its enumerated
powers, Congress entered into new territory and assumed a level of power for
which there is no prior precedent. Florida v. United States Dep’t. of Health and
Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2010). Congress explicitly
enacted the payments for non-compliance with the mandates as penalties, not
taxes, and exempted them from the usual enforcement mechanisms available for
the non-payment of taxes. 26 U.S.C. §5000A. Consequently, Defendants cannot
now claim that the penalties are taxes enacted under the General Welfare Clause.
12
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None of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I §8 give it the authority to
enact the expansive, intrusive mandates.
The mandates also trample upon Plaintiffs‟ free exercise rights under both
the First Amendment and RFRA by forcing them to either engage in a commercial
transaction that conflicts with their religious beliefs or pay a punitive penalty.
Adopting an improperly narrow view of Plaintiffs‟ claims, the district court
erroneously concluded that the individual and employer mandates impose no
burden on Plaintiffs‟ religious exercise. The district court disregarded the threat
posed by compelling Plaintiffs to purchase government-approved health insurance
coverage that collides with their sincerely held religious beliefs or pay a penalty.
That real and substantial threat places Plaintiffs in the kind of dilemma – choosing
between their religious beliefs or complying with a government mandate – that the
Supreme Court has rejected. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
Despite the presence of individualized exemptions and a gerrymander of some but
not all religious viewpoints, the district court concluded that the mandates were
neutral laws of general applicability that satisfied the rational basis test. However,
Supreme Court precedent establishes that the mandates are neither neutral nor
generally applicable and must be analyzed under strict scrutiny, which they fail to
satisfy. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).

13
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The “religious exemptions” to the insurance mandates grant differential and
preferential treatment to certain religious denominations in violation of both the
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection. The district court failed to follow
precedent when it improperly dismissed Plaintiffs‟ claims of violation of the
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection. This Court should reverse the district
court‟s ruling and find that the individual and employer mandates are
unconstitutional.
ARGUMENT
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), Duckworth v. State Administration Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F. 3d 769,
772 (4th Cir. 2003), accepts the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true and
construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived from therefrom in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiffs. Chisholm v. Transouth Financial Corp., 95 F.3d
331, 334 (4th Cir. 1996). A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if Plaintiffs
have alleged enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plaintiffs have exceeded those
standards. See, id. (factual allegation must “nudge” a plaintiff‟s claims over the
line from being merely possible to plausible); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,
1951 (2009) (same).
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This Court also applies de novo review to claims that a federal statute is
unconstitutional. U.S. v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 492 (4th Cir. 2006). Questions of law
or mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo. Wright v. West, 505 U.S.
277, 299-202 (1992) (O‟Connor, J. concurring). Where, as here, a decision
prejudices constitutional rights, de novo review is particularly appropriate since a
court‟s decision that substantially burdens fundamental rights should not be
accorded deference. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 642 (1993) (Stevens, J.
concurring).
De novo review here reveals that the individual and employer mandate
provisions upheld by the district court must be reversed. The Supreme Court has
never extended the Commerce Clause as far as the district court did in this case.
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1 (2005), discussed infra. This extraordinary expansion of Congress‟ enumerated
powers should not be given deferential review.
II.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
After finding that Plaintiffs Liberty, Waddell and Merrill had standing, that

their claims were ripe for adjudication, and not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act,
the district court proceeded to evaluate the merits, not merely the sufficiency of the
factual allegations. (JA 0164-0197). The court went beyond its limited role under
Rule 12(b)(6) of merely examining the allegations on their face to determine
15
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whether they state a plausible claim. Duckworth, 332 F. 3d at 772. The court
examined congressional reports, correspondence and other federal statutes to
determine the substantive merit of Plaintiffs‟ claims. (JA 0164-0197). The court
effectively transformed the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S.
669, 671 (1972) (per curiam).1 The district court did not leave open the possibility
of amending the Complaint or remanding the case for further consideration. The
court ruled that Congress acted within its powers under Art. I §8 and did not
violate Plaintiffs‟ constitutional and statutory rights. Consequently, the central
issue of this case–whether the challenged provisions of the Act comport with the
Constitution–is squarely presented for this Court‟s determination. This court can,
and should, address the underlying merits of the case.
A. The District Court Erred When It Determined That The
Mandates Are Proper Exercises Of Congress’ Authority Under
The Commerce Clause.
The cornerstone upon which Congress built the Act and the district court
based its decision is an unprecedented, expansive definition of Congress‟ authority
1

Even if the underlying ruling were regarded as the granting of a motion for
summary judgment instead of a motion to dismiss, this Court would still not apply
a deferential standard of review. A district court‟s order of summary judgment is
independently reviewable by the Court of Appeals. Sarfati v. Wood Holly
Associates, 874 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989). Where, as here, there are no
disputed issues of material fact, this Court must determine whether the district
court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment. Id.
16
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under Article I, §8, and particularly its power under the Commerce Clause. (JA
0169). The district court concluded that “Congress acted in accordance with its
constitutionally delegated powers under the Commerce Clause when it passed the
employer and individual coverage provisions of the Act,” effectively slamming the
door on any challenges to the sweeping and extensive intrusion into Plaintiffs‟
private lives and operations. (JA 0164). If Congress can redefine inactivity as
activity and force individuals who have chosen not to participate in commerce to
participate in commerce, then Congress can force every American to buy a General
Motors vehicle in order to prevent the demise of GM because transportation is
essential to the American way of life. Or, Congress could force every American to
buy domestically grown vegetables to prop up the local economy under the
rationale that eating vegetables is more healthful than fast food and will lower
healthcare costs while simultaneously infusing cash into domestic businesses. The
implications of the court‟s opinion are staggering.
1.

The individual mandate far exceeds the limitations the
Supreme Court has placed upon Congress’ authority
under the Commerce Clause.

Eschewing the most relevant and controlling precedents of United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000),
the district court claimed “that decisions to pay for health care without insurance
are economic activities follows from the Supreme Court‟s rulings in Wickard [v.
17
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Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)] and [Gonzales v.] Raich, [545 U.S. 1 (2005)]” (JA
0171). Together, Wickard and Raich teach that Congress has broad power to
regulate purely local matters that have substantial economic effects, even where
the regulated individuals claim not to participate in interstate commerce.” (JA
0169). Neither Wickard nor Raich, nor any other Supreme Court precedent,
supports the district court‟s conclusion.
a.

Raich does not support the district court’s expansive redefinition of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.

The flaw in the district court‟s reliance upon Raich is its failure to recognize
that the Raich plaintiffs did not challenge Congress‟ authority to enact the
underlying statute under the Commerce Clause. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15 The Raich
plaintiffs agreed that passage of the Controlled Substances Act was within
Congress‟ Commerce Clause power, and did not challenge any of the act‟s
provisions as outside of the reach of the Commerce Clause. Id. Instead, they
argued that the act‟s categorical prohibition on the manufacture and possession of
marijuana exceeded Congress‟ Commerce Clause power only when applied to
California-based manufacture and possession of medical marijuana because those
uses were legal in California. Id. Unlike here, there was no dispute that the
regulated class of activities–manufacturing, growing, possessing and/or selling
illegal drugs–was within the reach of Congress‟ power under the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 23. That being the case, the Court could not do what the plaintiffs
18
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requested–excise individual provisions from the law in order to permit them to
continue growing and possessing medical marijuana. Id.
In this case, the district court attempted to apply that finding in Raich to
Plaintiffs‟ claims regarding the mandates. (JA 0172). However, the analogy fails
since Raich dealt with plaintiffs who did not dispute Congress‟ authority to enact
the underlying statute. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23. Here, by contrast, Congress‟
authority to pass the Act is the central issue. Plaintiffs‟ claims are built upon the
proposition that Congress exceeded its delegated powers under Art. I §8 when it
approved the Act, and, in particular, the mandates. (JA 0012-0050). The Raich
court‟s analysis of an as-applied challenge to an indisputably proper exercise of
Congress‟ authority is inapposite and cannot “dictate the result in the present
matter,” as the district court claims. (JA 0167).
Even if the plaintiffs in Raich had brought a facial challenge to the power of
Congress to reach their acts of growing and possessing medical marijuana, the
Raich case would still not apply here because Raich involved voluntary activity,
whereas the Act regulates voluntary inactivity. The distinction between activity and
inactivity is critical. The plaintiffs in Raich could avoid Congress‟ reach by not
manufacturing or possessing marijuana, but here the Plaintiffs cannot avoid
Congress‟ reach even if they are not doing anything. Raich does not represent a
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broadening of Congress‟ Commerce Clause authority sufficient to encompass the
sweeping and intrusive mandate provisions in the Act.
Raich is not a sea change from the limitations placed upon Congress‟
Commerce Clause authority in Lopez and Morrison back to the expansive
definition in Wickard, 317 U.S. 111. Therefore it cannot be used to shore up the
district court‟s expansive re-definition of the Commerce Clause.
b.

Wickard does not support the district court’s conclusion
that private economic decisions can be regulated under
the Commerce Clause.

Even the broadened view in Wickard does not provide a foundation upon
which the district court can build its new expansive definition of congressional
power. According to the district court, “[t]he conclusion that decisions to pay for
health care without insurance are economic activities follows from the Supreme
Court‟s rulings in Wickard and Raich.” (JA 0171). Implicit in that statement is the
leap of logic that a decision not to engage in economic activity is the same as
actions taken to produce a crop. In other words, inactivity is the same as activity.
According to the court‟s analysis, whether Miss Waddell or Mrs. Merrill bought or
declined insurance is the same thing, and whether they acted or refused to act is not
meaningfully significant. Under the court‟s definition, Congress can regulate them
because they are legal citizens who merely exist. Mr. Filburn‟s decision to sow 23
acres and harvest more than 400 bushels of wheat, Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114,
20
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would become irrelevant because Congress could regulate Mr. Filburn even if he
did not grow and harvest wheat. Yet, it was the fact that Mr. Filburn actively grew
wheat beyond the quota, even if for personal use, that was significant in Wickard.
Congress could not have forced Mr. Filburn to grow wheat, but that is exactly what
the Act does in this case by forcing individuals to buy insurance.
Critical to the Court‟s conclusion in Wickard, and missing in this case, is the
fact that the wheat was planted, cultivated and harvested by Mr. Filburn, id., and it
was that activity that constituted economic activity. By contrast, Miss Waddell and
Mrs. Merrill have exerted no effort and used no resources. (JA 0019-0021). Mr.
Filburn was voluntarily and actively participating in the agricultural industry;
Plaintiffs have done nothing. Wickard merely expanded the type of economic
activity over which Congress had authority, id., and this is the outer limits of that
authority. Wickard did not convert inactivity into activity. It did not give Congress
authority over inactivity. (JA 0170-0172). Mr. Filburn could have avoided the
reach of Congress by not acting; Miss Waddell and Mrs. Merrill can never avoid
the reach of Congress under the district court‟s reasoning. The district court blazed
a new trail into the private economic decisions of law-abiding citizens. No
Supreme Court case has trod this lonely path and it would be dangerous to our
liberty to do so.
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Lopez and Morrison illustrate how the district court’s
decision contradicts the Supreme Court’s restrained
approach to Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.

Far less shocking attempts by Congress to regulate private gun ownership
and criminal sentencing in Lopez and Morrison were rejected by the Supreme
Court, and in Morrison, also rejected by this Court. Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) affirmed sub nom.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The mandates are more troubling
than were the provisions struck down in Lopez and Morrison since those statutes
were at least aimed at actions taken by individuals, i.e., obtaining a firearm and
possessing it near a school and engaging in criminal conduct against a woman,
while the mandates are aimed at people who have not taken any action. If the
statutes in Lopez and Morrison were outside of Congress‟ authority, then the
mandates are even more so.
In overturning Congress‟ attempt to use the Commerce Clause to prohibit
the possession of firearms near local schools, the Lopez Court emphasized the
importance of limiting Congress‟ enumerated powers to protect fundamental
liberties. 514 U.S. at 552. As Defendants did in this case, the government
defendants in Lopez presented a chain of events that they claimed brought
possession of a firearm in a school zone under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 563.
The government argued that possessing a firearm in a school zone might result in
22
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violence which might affect the national economy by spreading costs throughout
the population, reducing travel and threatening productivity by threatening the
learning environment. Id. Lopez said, “if we were to accept the Government‟s
arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate.” Id. at 564. “To uphold the Government‟s
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States,” something the Court was
unwilling to do. Id. at 566-568.
In Morrison, the Court built upon Lopez to overturn a portion of the
Violence Against Women Act which instituted a civil remedy for female victims of
violent crime. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. As in Lopez, the Morrison Court rejected
the argument that a remote chain of inferences can justify the regulation of noneconomic activity. Id. at 607. “Lopez emphasized . . . that even under our modern,
expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress‟ regulatory authority
is not without effective bounds.” Id. at 608. “[T]hus far in our Nation‟s history our
cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where
that activity is economic in nature.” Id. at 613 (emphasis added). “Gendermotivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity.” Id. As it did in Lopez, the Court expressed concern for the potential
23
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effects of enlarging Congress‟ Commerce Clause powers as suggested by the
government. Id. at 615. “Petitioners‟ reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress
to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as
well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate
effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is
undoubtedly significant.” Id. at 615-616. “We accordingly reject the argument that
Congress may regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on the
conduct‟s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 617.
Simply because Congress stated that the total incidence of decisions against
purchasing health insurance has a substantial impact on the national market for
health care does not, as the district court believes, make it so. (JA 0171) Id.; Lopez,
514 U.S. at 557 n.2. “Under our written Constitution . . . the limitation of
congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.” Morrison, 529
U.S. at 616.
If the district court‟s view of the Commerce Clause were true, then Congress
could force those who dislike vegetables to purchase and consume them using the
rationale that everyone has to eat, and vegetables are more healthful than fast food.
There are some things Congress simply cannot do. The mandates are beyond the
power of Congress. Neither Wickard, Raich, Morrison nor Lopez support the
court‟s expansive re-definition of the Commerce Clause.
24
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The Trial Court Erred When It Held That The
Employer Mandate Is Valid Under The Commerce
Clause.

The district court also expansively redefined “wages” when it concluded that
the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to mandate that employers
provide health insurance coverage to their employees. (JA 0174). Comparing the
mandate provision to minimum wage and hour laws, the district court concluded
that “the opportunity provided to an employee to enroll in an employer-sponsored
health care plan is a valuable benefit offered in exchange for the employee‟s labor,
much like a wage or salary.” (JA0174). The district court found that “the employer
coverage requirement is more accurately described as regulating of the terms of the
employment contract.” (JA 0174). The court said that employers are already
engaged in commerce and the fact that they will need to arrange with third party
insurers to offer coverage to their employees “is of no consequence.” (JA 0174).
The court did not explain how mandating that private employers enter into a
contract with other private parties for a particular product to benefit employees has
no consequences for employers. The district court did not explain how such a third
party contract can be likened to minimum wage laws that the Supreme Court has
found permissible as a means of preventing unfair competition and labor strikes.
See, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor
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Standards Act “FLSA”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(upholding the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)).
The district court cited Darby and Jones & Laughlin, but then incorrectly
expanded their holdings to include not merely minimum wages and hours, but all
of the terms and conditions of employment. (JA 0173). Utilizing that expansive
misinterpretation of Darby and Jones & Laughlin, the court concluded that “a
rational basis exists for Congress to conclude that the terms of health coverage
offered by employers to their employees have substantial effects cumulatively on
interstate commerce.” (JA 0174). However, Darby and Jones & Laughlin do not
support this conclusion. In both cases, the Supreme Court carefully discussed the
interplay between the challenged provisions and interstate commerce. Darby, 312
U.S. at 115; Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 31. The Court was concerned about the
effects of strikes on the movement of goods and services and the effects of
underpaying workers and cutting prices on competition, and on those bases found
that the wage and hour laws comported with the Commerce Clause. Jones &
Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 31; Darby, 312 U.S. at 115. Neither case supports the district
court‟s proposition that all aspects of the employment relationship can be subject
to Congress‟ control.
In Jones & Laughlin, the Court was careful to qualify its conclusion that the
NLRA was a valid exercise of Congress‟ Commerce Clause authority in a way that
26
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is fatal to the district court‟s conclusion here. 301 U.S. at 31. The Court noted that
the definitions of “commerce” and “affecting commerce” were carefully drafted to
complement Congress‟ authority under the Commerce Clause. Id. “Commerce”
was defined to include only interstate and foreign commerce, and “affecting
commerce” was defined as “„in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce
or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute
burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.‟” Id.
This definition is one of exclusion as well as inclusion. The grant of
authority to the Board does not purport to extend to the relationship
between all industrial employees and employers. Its terms do not
impose collective bargaining upon all industry regardless of effects
upon interstate or foreign commerce. It purports to reach only what
may be deemed to burden or obstruct that commerce and, thus
qualified, it must be construed as contemplating the exercise of
control within constitutional bounds.
Id. (emphasis added). “The act does not compel agreements between employers
and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever.” Id. at 45. (emphasis
added). “The act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select its employees or to discharge them.” Id. By contrast, the
employer mandate does compel employers to provide health insurance or pay a
penalty. Section 1513, 26 U.S.C. §4980H. It mandates that private employers enter
into agreements with other private businesses to provide health insurance dictated
by the government. Id.
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The employer mandate is also dissimilar to the wage and hours laws found
constitutional in Darby, 312 U.S. at 115. As was true of the laws validated in Jones
& Laughlin, the standards upheld in Darby did not intrude into all aspects of the
employment relationship. Id. Instead, the challenged provisions were carefully
worded to prohibit only the shipment of goods in interstate commerce which were
produced by workers who were not paid at least a minimum wage and were
required to work more than a maximum number of permitted hours per week. Id. at
110. Unlike the provisions at issue here, the wage and hour provisions in Darby
applied only to employees who produced goods to be used in interstate commerce
and did not prescribe what must be contained within the employment contract,
other than setting a floor for wages and a ceiling for hours. Id. The Court found
that the law “is thus directed at the suppression of a method or kind of competition
in interstate commerce which it has in effect condemned as „unfair.‟” Id. at 122.
By contrast, the mandates are not targeted to address only particular anticompetitive conduct that will adversely affect interstate commerce, but are
expansive regulations of the intimate details of the employer-employee
relationship. Congress is not merely setting parameters within which those who
want to engage in interstate commerce can operate, but is mandating that all those
who employ other people in any type of endeavor must contract with a private
party to provide a government-defined product at a government-defined price to
28
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their employees or pay penalties. 26 U.S.C. §4980H. The Supreme Court has not
permitted Congress to intrude that far into the employer-employee relationship.
Congress‟ efforts to protect the integrity of the national economy through
targeted statutes aimed at preventing the violation of employees‟ rights while
protecting employers‟ rights, exemplified by the laws in Jones & Laughlin and
Darby, are a far cry from Congress‟ efforts here. Rather that acting to prevent
abuses that could adversely affect the flow of commerce, Congress is interfering
with the flow of business by compelling employers to transact business with third
parties. Under that logic, Congress could compel employers to offer employees
expense accounts, company cars, or any other perquisites it deems valuable in
exchange for labor. That scenario far exceeds the boundaries of Congress‟ power
established in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 and Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616, and even the
definition of commerce in Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-129.
3.

The trial court’s finding that the mandates are
reasonable extensions of Congress’ enumerated powers
contradicts the foundational principle that Congress’
enumerated powers are to be exercised within the
boundaries of federalism.

The district court utterly disregarded the dual system of government set forth
by the Founders. “[E]ven [our] modern-era precedents which have expanded
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congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is
subject to outer limits.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court was careful to explain that its holding
was limited. 301 U.S. at 37. The Court warned that the scope of the interstate
commerce power “must be considered in the light of our dual system of
government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local and create a completely centralized government.” Id. That is precisely
what will happen if the district court‟s decision stands. Congress will have
obtained the right to intrude upon the private decisions of individuals and
employers, to force them to buy or provide a product, and to mandate the details of
that product.
If Congress is permitted to force individuals to purchase health insurance of
a particular type at a particular price, it will be “difficult to perceive any limitation
on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated
powers. See Art. I, § 8. As James Madison wrote: “The powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments
are numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C.
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Rossiter ed. 1961). This constitutionally mandated division of
authority “was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our
fundamental liberties.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458, 111
S.Ct. 2395, 2400, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” Ibid.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. The Founders deliberately withheld from Congress “a
plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation.
See Art. I, § 8.” Id. at 566. “[W]e always have rejected readings of the Commerce
Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a
police power; our cases are quite clear that there are real limits to federal power.”
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
When analyzing a challenge to Congress‟ exercise of an enumerated power,
the court‟s task is to understand and apply “the framework set forth in the
Constitution.” United States v. New York, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). “The question
is not what power the Federal Government ought to have but what powers in fact
have been given by the people.” Id. Nevertheless, the district court re-wrote those
parameters by upholding the mandates. The conclusion by the district court is
antithetical to the Constitution.
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The trial court erred in equating the mandate
provisions with Congress’ regulation of the business of
health insurance.

The district court also mistakenly characterized the mandate provisions as
merely a further example of Congress exercising its power to regulate the business
of health insurance. Congress cited to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), as authority for the mandate provision. Section
1501(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(3). The district court cited South-Eastern
Underwriters, and compared the mandate provisions to Medicare, the Employee
Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”), and Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) (JA 0176). As is true about the district
court‟s analysis of Supreme Court precedent, its attempt to analogize Congress‟
intrusion into the private lives of law-abiding citizens to its regulation of certain
aspects of the insurance industry fails.
In South-Eastern Underwriters, the Supreme Court confirmed that the
insurance industry is subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause. SouthEastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 553. The plaintiffs in South-Eastern
Underwriters challenged indictments charging violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, claiming that insurance was not subject to the Sherman Act or Congress‟
power over interstate commerce. Id. at 536. The Supreme Court rejected both
32
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contentions. Id. at 552-553. “No commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts
its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an exception of
the business of insurance.” Id. at 553. Congress‟ “power to determine the rules of
intercourse across state lines was essential to weld a loose confederacy into a
single, indivisible nation; its continued existence is equally essential to the welfare
of that nation.” Id. at 552. But, the authority to regulate aspects of the insurance
industry does not grant Congress the power to dictate that all citizens participate by
either purchasing government-defined policy or paying a penalty. Regulating an
interstate industry to protect against anti-competitive or other injurious conduct is
one thing; demanding participation in the industry is quite another. Congress‟
enactment of ERISA, COBRA, HIPAA and similar laws are examples of the
former, not the latter. Notably, in those enactments, unlike the Act here, Congress
made clear that it was not interfering with individual freedom. Those laws
permitting some federal regulation of the insurance industry are inapposite to the
Act and the mandates. Insurance companies and employers are only regulated if
they chose to enter into the insurance market by either insuring or offering
insurance. Neither insurance companies nor employers are forced to insure or offer
insurance. Here, however, the Act forces employers to offer a government-defined
insurance program at the level and cost set by the government. Moreover, none of
33
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the laws relied on by the district court regulate individuals per se, and none of them
force individuals to buy insurance. Here, the Act forces unwilling individuals to
purchase a government-defined health insurance package. Being forced into the
market is critically different than being regulated after one voluntarily participates
in the market.
Congress emphasized the continuing importance of individual liberties when
it enacted what became known as Medicare in 1965.
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal
officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the
practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are
provided, or over the selection, tenure, or compensation of any officer
or employee of any institution, agency, or person providing health
services; or to exercise any supervision or control over the
administration or operation of any such institution, agency, or person.
42 U.S.C. §1395. Congress was explicit about its concern regarding individual
freedom in what became 42 U.S.C. §1395a, stating: “Basic freedom of choice-Any
individual entitled to insurance benefits under this subchapter may obtain health
services from any institution, agency, or person qualified to participate under this
subchapter if such institution, agency, or person undertakes to provide him such
services.” In the Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled Act (Medicare),
Congress did not attempt to override the will of individuals or employers and
compel participation under penalty. The mandate provisions are not merely a
natural extension of Medicare. Individuals may choose to not take Medicare and
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doctors may choose not to accept Medicare patients. By contrastr, the Act forces
individuals to obtain insurance and employers to provide it.
Similarly, when it enacted ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et. seq., Congress was
cognizant of the voluntary nature of employee pension plan benefits. H.R. Rep. 93533 on Public Law 93-406 1974 USCCAN 4639. Congress enacted ERISA to
protect the interests of participants in existing employee benefit plans. Yates v.
Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 6 (2004). ERISA established reporting requirements, vesting
and funding standards and fiduciary obligations to protect employees‟ investments
in pension plans, and, in particular, to protect employees from losses when pension
plans are under funded. Id. at 6-7. Congress was clear that it wanted to encourage
employers to offer these plans to employees, but that employers and employees
retained their freedom to make decisions regarding the plans. 1974 USCCAN at
4647. Unlike the mandate provisions here, ERISA does not compel employers to
offer such plans, nor employees to participate in them. Instead, as is true with other
Commerce Clause legislation, ERISA regulates those who have voluntarily
engaged in an activity or entered into an agreement. Employers do not have to
create and offer pension plans, but if they decide to, then they will have to comply
with ERISA. ERISA is unlike the mandates established under the Act and does not
support the district court‟s finding that the Act is a valid exercise of Congress‟
enumerated powers.
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In Title X of COBRA Congress instituted standards to protect employees
who voluntarily agreed to participate in group health plans that their employers
voluntarily agreed to offer. Public L. No. 99-272, §§ 10001-10003 (1986), 100
Stat. 82, The relevant provisions in COBRA provide that an employee must be
permitted to continue participating in the group health insurance program for a
period of time after the employment ends. Id. at § 10001(c). COBRA provides that
if an employer decides to no longer offer group health plans to its employees, then
the continuation provisions in COBRA no longer apply. Id. In other words,
employers retain their freedom to not offer or discontinue offering employee health
insurance benefits. Id. As is true with ERISA, COBRA contains provisions that
regulate employers who have voluntarily agreed to provide group health plan
benefits and benefit employees who have voluntarily agreed to participate in the
plans. Id. If either party decides to no longer participate in the program, then no
one is compelled to do so. Id. COBRA does not support the proposition that
Congress can use its authority under the Commerce Clause to compel employers to
offer group health plans and employees to participate in them, as the district court
implies. (JA 0176).
HIPAA also does not support the district court‟s conclusion that the mandate
provisions are a natural extension of Congress‟ regulation of the health insurance
industry. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in various sections
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beginning with 42 U.S.C. §300gg). As is true with ERISA and COBRA, HIPAA
does not mandate that companies or individuals participate in the health insurance
industry, but regulates companies which have voluntarily agreed to offer health
insurance to individuals and groups. See id., Title I, 110 Stat. at 1939-1991. No
individual or organization is compelled to offer or purchase health insurance
against his/its will. Id. Instead, organizations that want to provide health insurance
coverage to others must agree, as a part of engaging in that business, to abide by
certain rules and regulations sent forth in HIPAA. Id. Unlike the Act here, HIPAA
does not demand that companies either partake in the health insurance industry or
pay punitive sanctions.
Far from merely being a logical extension of Congress‟ authority to regulate
the insurance industry, the mandate provisions are a giant leap into uncharted
territory. Congress is attempting to move from regulating voluntary conduct that
affects the national economy to managing private decisions and even inactivity.
Congress is attempting to extend its reach from economic activities to noneconomic non-activities and to regulate personal decision making. The intrusive
and expansive power exemplified in the mandates is without precedent.
B.

The Mandates Exceed Congress’ Authority Under The
Necessary and Proper Clause.

Although the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority
to pass laws in furtherance of its constitutionally-enumerated powers, its authority
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is not unbridled. Commonwealth v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 5059718 at *10.

2

The

Necessary and Proper Clause only permits Congress to enact laws that are
authorized by one of its enumerated powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
405, 421 (1819). “As the Supreme Court noted in Buckley v. Valeo, „Congress has
plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, ...
so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional
restriction.‟” Id. at 9 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976)). In other
words, the Necessary and Proper Clause “does not give Congress carte blanche,”
but must be premised upon an existing enumerated power. United States v.
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1970 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
As Chief Justice John Marshall observed in McCulloch, “„[l]et the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.‟”
Commonwealth v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 5059718 at *10 (quoting McCulloch, 17
U.S. at 421). Citing that language from McCulloch, the Comstock Court described
the means-end test that should be used to determine whether Congress has
exceeded its authority. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956. “[I]n determining whether the
The district court did not reach the question of whether the mandates are
valid under the Necessary and Proper or General Welfare Clause. U.S. Const., art I
§ 8, cl. 18, 1.
38
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Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a
particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means
that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated
power.” Id. Since there is no constitutionally enumerated power upon which
Congress could base its attempt to compel Americans to engage in commerce or
pay a penalty, the analysis will necessarily result in a finding that the mandates
exceed Congress‟ power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
This conclusion is further borne out by Judge Vinson‟s observations
regarding the nature of the mandates. Florida v. United States Dep’t. of Health and
Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2010). “The Commerce
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause have never been applied in such a manner
before.” Id. “The power that the individual mandate seeks to harness is simply
without prior precedent.” Id.
The Congressional Research Service (a nonpartisan legal „think tank‟
that works exclusively for Congress and provides analysis on the
constitutionality of pending legislation) advised Congress on July 24,
2009, long before the Act was passed into law, that „it is unclear
whether the [Commerce Clause] would provide a solid constitutional
foundation for legislation containing a requirement to have health
insurance.” The analysis goes on to state that the individual mandate
presents “the most challenging question ... as it is a novel issue
whether Congress may use this clause to require an individual to
purchase a good or service.” Congressional Research Service,
Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional
Analysis, July 24, 2009, at 3.
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Clearly, Congress was not relying upon existing precedent or an enumerated power
when it enacted the mandates. Since the mandates are not authorized by an Article
I §8 power they cannot be valid.
C.

The Mandates Are Not Valid Exercises of Congress’
Authority Under The General Welfare Clause.

The Taxing and Spending or General Welfare Clause does not vest Congress
with the authority to enact the mandates. The Supreme Court has long held that
Congress cannot enact a tax to indirectly regulate what it cannot directly regulate
under its enumerated powers. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 30, 37 (1922)
(citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423). Congress cannot use the penalty provision in
Sections 1501 and 1513 to compel individuals and employers to purchase
government-approved health insurance policies when Congress cannot otherwise
compel such conduct under the Commerce Clause.
Congress has made it clear that the penalties under Sections 1501 and 1513
are just that–penalties–and not taxes, and the Defendants cannot ignore that intent
to posture its last minute litigation tactic. Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605
(1903). A provision will not be regarded as a tax if it “clearly appears” that
Congress did not intend to enact a tax. Id. at 613.
Congress referred to the payments as “penalties,” not “taxes,” while using
the term “taxes” elsewhere in the Act. Compare Section 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.
§5000A(b) (“penalty”), with Sections 9001, 26 U.S.C. § 4980I (a) (“excise tax” on
40
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high cost employer-sponsored health coverage), 9007(b), 26 U.S.C. §4959
(“excise tax” on failure to meet hospital exemption requirements), and Section
10907, 26 U.S.C. § 5000B (“excise tax” on indoor tanning services). Although the
noncompliance penalties were added to the Internal Revenue Code, Congress
specifically exempted them from the criminal penalties, liens and levies imposed
upon nonpayment of taxes, because they were not to be regarded as taxes. Section
1501(g)(2), 26 U.S.C. §5000A(g)(2). Congress did not identify any revenuegenerating purposes for the payments, which is required for imposition of a tax.
See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,
841 (1995) (a “tax” as used in the Constitution is an exaction for support of the
government). Congress relied exclusively upon the Commerce Clause in its
findings. Section 1501(a), 42 U.S.C. §18091. From these factors it “clearly
appears” that Congress intended that the noncompliance payments be penalties, not
taxes.3
The legislative history of the Act shows that Congress intentionally changed
the terminology from “tax” to “penalty.” Each of the earlier versions of the bill in

3

This conclusion is further supported by public statements made by President
Obama, the Act‟s chief proponent.: “For us to say you have to take responsibility
to get health insurance is absolutely not a tax increase,” and “Nobody considers
that
a
tax
increase.”
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/20/
obama.health.care/index.html (last visited January 11, 2011).
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both the House of Representatives and the Senate used the term “tax” when
referring to the assessment for noncompliance with the insurance mandate, as
explained by Judge Hudson and, in greater detail by Judge Vinson in Florida v.
HHS, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1133:
For example, America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009”
(H.R. 3200) was introduced in the House of Representatives on July
14, 2009. Like the Act, it contained an individual mandate and
concomitant penalty. However, it called the penalty a tax. Section 401
was unambiguously titled “Tax on Individuals Without Acceptable
Health Care Coverage,” and went on to refer to the exaction as a “tax”
no less than fourteen times in that section alone. See, e.g., id.
(providing that with respect to “any individual who does not meet the
requirements of subsection (d) at any time during the taxable year,
there is hereby imposed a tax”). H.R. 3200 was thereafter superseded
by a similar bill, “Affordable Health Care for America Act” (H.R.
3962), which was actually passed in the House of Representatives on
November 7, 2009. That second House bill also included an individual
mandate and penalty, and it repeatedly referred to the penalty as a
“tax.” See, e.g., Section 501 (providing that for any person who does
not comply with the individual mandate “there is hereby imposed a
tax,” and referring to that “tax” multiple times); Section 307(c)(1)(A)
(further referring to the penalty as a “tax[ ] on individuals not
obtaining acceptable coverage”).
While the above bills were being considered in the House, the
Senate was working on its healthcare reform bills as well. On October
13, 2009, the Senate Finance Committee passed a bill, “America's
Healthy Future Act” (S. 1796). A precursor to the Act, this bill
contained an individual mandate and accompanying penalty. In the
section titled “Excise Tax on Individuals Without Essential Health
Benefits Coverage,” the penalty was called a “tax.” See Section 1301
(“If an applicable individual fails to [obtain required insurance] there
is hereby imposed a tax”).
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See also, Commonwealth v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 5059718 at *9. In the final version
of the Act enacted by the Senate on December 24, 2009, the term “penalty” was
substituted for “tax” in Section 1501(b)(1). 26 U.S.C. §5000A. “A logical
inference can be drawn that the substitution of this critical language was a
conscious and deliberate act on the part of Congress. Commonwealth v. Sebelius,
2010 WL 5059718 at *18 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24
(1983)). “Congress‟s conspicuous decision to not use the term “tax” in the Act
when referring to the exaction (as it had done in at least three earlier incarnations
of the legislation) is significant. Florida v. HHS, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. “„Few
principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that
Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier
discarded in favor of other language.‟” Id. at 1134-1135 (citing INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442 (1987)).
Congress‟ actions and its words clearly communicate that the penalty
provisions in the individual and employer mandates are penalties, not taxes, and
therefore could not have been enacted pursuant to Congress‟ power to tax and
spend for the general welfare under Article I, §8.
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The Mandates Violate Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Rights By
Compelling Plaintiffs To Choose Between Their Sincerely
Held Religious Beliefs And Paying A Penalty.

Despite explicit references to individualized exemptions in the text of the
Act, the district court concluded that the Act is a neutral law of general
applicability which survives rational basis review. (JA 0184). The district court‟s
conclusion is in error.
1.

The Mandates Violate Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Rights
Under the First Amendment.

The district court pointed to the “religious conscience” exemptions in
Section 1501 as examples of Congress‟ attempt to accommodate religious belief
instead of efforts to carve out individualized exemptions for particular categories
of believers. (JA 0184). Relying upon that premise, the district court concluded
that the Act is a neutral law of general applicability that only incidentally burdens
religion and is subject only to rational basis review under Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Under Smith, a law which is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if
the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Id. at
878. However, if the law contains individualized exemptions, it is not a neutral law
of general applicability and will not survive a free exercise challenge unless the
government can establish that it is justified by a compelling interest and narrowly
tailored to advance that interest. Id. at 884; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
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v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). The “Free Exercise Clause protects
against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt.” Lukumi, 508
U.S. at 534. “The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of
governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.” Id. The
court must look carefully at the exemptions permitted to “protect religious
observers against unequal treatment.” Id. at 542. Categories of selection are of
“paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious
practice.” Id.
The Act subjects religious observers such as Plaintiffs to unequal treatment
and are just the type of “religious gerrymanders” that the Supreme Court warned
against in Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534, 542. Section 1501 exempts those who “cannot
afford coverage,” defined according to a premium to income ratio; those who have
incomes below 100 percent of the poverty line, members of Indian tribes and those
whom the Administration determines have suffered a hardship affecting their
ability to purchase insurance. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(e). The exemptions for some, but
not all, religious beliefs are particularly problematic since they grant preferred
status only to certain religious adherents. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d)(2). The “religious
conscience” exemption provides that individuals who are members of religious
sects which have been in existence since December 31, 1950, which have tenets
against participation in government support programs, and which have
45
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demonstrated that they provide care for dependent members are not subject to the
penalties described in Section 1501. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d)(2) (citing 26 U.S.C. §
1402). The “health care sharing ministry exemption” provides that people who are
members of nonprofit organizations in existence continuously since December 31,
1999 which share a common set of ethical or religious beliefs and have since
December 31, 1999 continuously shared medical expenses among members in
accordance with those beliefs and without regard to members‟ states of residence
or employment are not subject to the sanctions imposed by Section 1501. 26
U.S.C. §5000A(d)(2).
Individuals like Plaintiffs must comply but parties who demonstrate
financial hardship do not. Plaintiffs, who have religious objections to the
compelled purchase of a prescribed health insurance product, will be subject to
penalty but those who have similar religious objections will be exempt because
they are members of specified religious sects. Individuals who share common
ethical beliefs and would like to share medical expenses, but failed to form an
organization by December 31, 1999, will be unable to exempt themselves from
Section 1501‟s requirements, but those who did form an organization by December
31, 1999 will be exempt. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d)(2). The Act clearly includes

46

Case: 10-2347 Document: 10

Date Filed: 01/18/2011

Page: 57

individualized exemptions and a gerrymander of some but not all religious
viewpoints, and thus strict scrutiny is applicable under Smith.4
The mandates burden Plaintiffs‟ sincerely held religious beliefs by
compelling them to obtain health insurance for those medical services that the
government deems are “minimum essential coverage,” regardless of whether the
services are essential, affordable or objectionable to Plaintiffs. 26 U.S.C. §5000A.
Plaintiffs will not be permitted to opt out of paying for medical procedures that
violate their sincerely held religious beliefs, but will be faced with the choice of
compromising their religious beliefs or paying a penalty. Id. The district court
dismissed Plaintiffs‟ assertion of burden by claiming that Plaintiffs‟ only objection
was to subsidizing abortion and that there allegedly are provisions within the Act
to protect against such subsidies. (JA 0184-0187). While objection to funding
abortion is certainly of vital importance to Plaintiffs, it is not the only aspect of the
Act that burdens Plaintiffs‟ religious beliefs. (JA 0018-0021). Plaintiffs allege that
being forced to obtain what the government defines as minimum essential
4

Further evidence of the fact that the Act is not generally applicable can be seen
in exemptions the Department of Health and Human Services has granted to
relieve companies from some of the other provisions of the Act. For example, as of
December 3, 2010, 222 companies have been granted one-year waivers of the
Act‟s annual limit restrictions on health insurance policies. The waivers affect
more
than
1.5
million
people.
http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/approved_applications_for_waiver.html (last
visited January 10, 2011).
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coverage, with no opportunity to opt out, will require that they pay for medical
procedures even if they are antithetical to their religious beliefs. (JA 0018-0021).
In addition, Miss Waddell and Mrs. Merrill will be compelled to abandon their
religious beliefs that they should live their lives so that they provide for their own
medical needs without relying upon third party insurance companies. (JA 00180021). The Defendants must prove that the provisions are justified by a compelling
interest and narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. They
cannot meet that burden.
Congress asserts that the mandate provisions are necessary to increase the
supply of and demand for health care services, increase the number of Americans
who have health insurance, achieve near-universal health insurance coverage by
strengthening the employer-based health insurance market, and improve financial
security for families. 42 U.S.C. § 18091. Improving financial stability by adding
customers to a large interstate health insurance market is not a compelling interest,
and the mandates are not narrowly tailored to advance those interests at any rate.
The mandate provisions will not necessarily increase the number who have health
insurance or even provide revenue targeted to providing coverage. Section 1501
says that individuals purchase health insurance or pay a penalty, but the penalty is
not a revenue generator designed to cover the costs of the uninsured. The Act does
not specify that revenues realized from the penalties will be used to purchase
48
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insurance for those who are uninsured, so the penalties will not advance the goal of
insuring more individuals. The provisions do not advance the goal of nearuniversal coverage since they do not ensure that every uninsured person, or even
the majority of uninsured people, will have insurance. The mandate provisions will
not necessarily increase the supply or demand for health insurance or health care
services since uninsured people will not necessarily become insured. Finally, a
requirement that families either pay for health insurance that they do not presently
pay for, adapt their coverage to meet “minimum essential coverage,” presumably at
a higher cost, or be subject to an increased tax liability does not improve “financial
security.” Congress‟ intrusion into the private decisions of American citizens does
not advance the interests asserted in the Act, and therefore the mandates cannot
withstand strict scrutiny.
The relationship between the “religious exemptions” and the asserted
interests under the Act is even more tenuous. If, as Congress asserts, the goal is to
increase the number of insureds, then exempting uninsured Americans who belong
to certain religious organizations does not advance that interest. Even if Congress
tries to justify the “religious exemptions” by saying that the exempted groups have
alternative programs that meet the goal of paying for health care needs, it still
would not explain why only the specified groups have an exemption and similar
groups do not. Denying Plaintiffs the ability to participate in such an exemption
49
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does nothing to advance Congress‟ stated goal of improving the level of coverage
for health care costs.
The mandate provisions are not neutral or generally applicable, impose
substantial burdens upon Plaintiffs‟ religious beliefs, and are not narrowly tailored
to advance a compelling state interest. They fail the strict scrutiny test required
under Smith, 424 U.S. at 884.
2.

The mandates violate Plaintiffs’ free exercise rights
under RFRA.

Even if the mandate provisions were found to be laws of general
applicability, they would still be subject to and fail strict scrutiny under RFRA. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b); see also Gonzales v. O. Centro Espirita Beneficiente
Uniao de Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). RFRA provides that the government
cannot substantially burden religious exercise, even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability, unless the government can “demonstrat[e] that
application of the burden to the person–(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b))
(emphasis added). RFRA imposes a more demanding strict scrutiny review than
does the First Amendment under Smith in that it “requires the Government to
demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the
challenged law „to the person‟–the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of
50
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religion is being substantially burdened. Id. at 430-431. Defendants cannot meet
that burden.
That is particularly true in light of the fact that the statutory provision
invalidated in Gonzales, like the mandate provisions here, contained a religious
exemption that was applied to one religious group but not to the plaintiffs. Id. at
433-434. In Gonzales, the existing religious exemption in the Controlled
Substances Act was fatal to the government‟s claim that members of the plaintiff
church were not entitled to an exemption for their sacramental use of hoasca tea.
Id. at 433-434. The Court reasoned that if the use of a controlled substance, peyote,
was permitted for hundreds of thousands of Native Americans under the existing
religious exemption, then the government could not preclude a similar exception
for the 130 or so UDV church members who wanted to similarly use a controlled
substance to practice their faith. Id. at 433. The same is true in this case. If
exemption from the mandate is permitted for adherents of certain religious sects,
then Defendants cannot justify precluding followers of other religious traditions
who object to the mandate. If exemption from the mandate is permitted for
members of health care sharing ministries established before January 1, 2000, then
Defendants cannot preclude others who form similar ministries after January 1,
2000.
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“Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct
mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While
the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial.” Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). Plaintiffs have
alleged that the Act compels them to either purchase health insurance that collides
with their religious convictions. (JA 0018-0021, 0029-0030). This places
substantial pressure upon Plaintiffs to modify their behavior and participate in a
government-defined system in violation of their religious beliefs. (JA 0019-0021).
Defendants cannot meet their burden of showing that the provisions are narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest. The mandates violate RFRA.
E.

The Preferential Treatment Of The Religious Views Of
Those Who Would Qualify For The Religious
Exemptions Violates The Establishment Clause.

The preferential treatment accorded to those who qualify for the “religious
exemptions” to the mandates violates the “clearest command of the Establishment
Clause,” i.e., that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). In Larson, the Court noted
“no State can „pass laws which aid one religion‟ or that „prefer one religion over
another.‟” Id. at 246 (citing Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).
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“„The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government ... effect
no favoritism among sects ... and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.‟”
Id. (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg,
J., concurring)). Consequently, “when we are presented with a state law granting a
denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect
and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.” Id.
The “religious exemptions” in Section 1501 grant preferences to members of
particular religious sects, i.e. those which have been in existence since December
31, 1950, have tenets against participation in government support programs, and
have demonstrated that they provide care for dependent members. 26 U.S.C. §
5000A(d)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 1402. Members of religious denominations which meet
those criteria do not have to comply with the mandates and will not be subject to
the penalties for non-compliance. Id. However, Plaintiffs, who are not part of those
denominations, must comply with the requirements or pay the penalties, placing
them at a disadvantage for no reason other that they do not belong to the preferred
religious group. Larson makes clear that the provision is not valid. Larson, 456
U.S. at 246.
The district court erred when it applied the test established in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) to find that the exemptions did not violate the
Establishment Clause. (JA 0178-0183). The Lemon test is intended to apply only to
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laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and not to provisions that
discriminate among religions. Larson, 456 U.S. at 252. Lemon is inapplicable.
F.

The Differential Treatment Accorded To Plaintiffs’
Religious Beliefs Violates Equal Protection.

Equal protection under the Fifth Amendment requires that all people
similarly situated be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
Classifications such as the “religious exemptions” in Section 1501 must bear some
fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose. Id. The pertinent inquiry is whether
the classification advances legitimate legislative goals in a rational fashion.
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981). The classification must have some
rational basis and the court cannot substitute its personal notions of good public
policy for those of Congress, id., which is precisely what the district court did.
Congress did not explain how exempting certain uninsured people from the
provisions meet the goals of increasing demand for health insurance, decreasing
the number of uninsureds, and attaining near universal coverage. 42 U.S.C.
§18091; 26 U.S.C. §5000A. Congress did not explain how exempting members of
50-year-old religious sects with member care programs and conscientious
objections to insurance, but not members of similar sects that are less than 50 years
old advances its stated goals. Id. Nor did Congress explain how exempting
members of “healthcare sharing ministries” that are at least 10 years but not
members of similar ministries that are less than 10 years old advances its
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legislative goals. Id. The district court devised its own reasons, but did not offer a
rational basis for the exemptions. (JA 0189-0190). Even if the court‟s explanation
were true, it would not account for the differentiation based upon the relative ages
of the religious organizations.
Absent a rational basis for the distinctions made in the exemptions, the
district court should have found that the mandates violate equal protection.
CONCLUSION
Congress exceeded its authority under Art. I §8 of the Constitution when it
enacted the Act, and, particularly, the mandates. The provisions cannot be
reconciled with Congress‟ limited powers under the Commerce Clause. Nor do the
Necessary and Proper Clause, or the General Welfare Clause support the Act. The
mandate provisions also violate Plaintiffs‟ free exercise rights under the First
Amendment and RFRA, along with the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection
Clause. This court should reverse the district court on the merits and declare the
Act, and particularly the individual and employer mandates unconstitutional.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs request oral argument under F.R.App.P 34 because this case
addresses issues of first impression and of great constitutional significance, i.e.,
whether Congress has authority to force individuals to buy and employers to
provide a government approved health insurance product and a government55
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defined price. The Act is an unprecedented extension of congressional authority
and has far reaching consequence well beyond health insurance.
The decision below is in conflict with a decision in the Eastern District of
Virginia on the individual mandate portion of the Act. Commonwealth of Va. v.
Sebelius, 2010 WL 5059718. Therefore, it is particularly important for this court to
resolve the conflict, and Plaintiffs believe that oral argument will be important in
that regard. Consequently, Plaintiffs respectfully request oral argument.
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Lynchburg, VA 24506
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court@lc.org Email
Attorneys for Appellants
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United States Code Annotated
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code
Subtitle A Income Taxes
Chapter 2. Tax on Self-Employment Income
§ 1402. Definitions

(g) Members of certain religious faiths.-(1) Exemption.--Any individual may file an application (in such form and
manner, and with such official, as may be prescribed by regulations under this
chapter) for an exemption from the tax imposed by this chapter if he is a member
of a recognized religious sect or division thereof and is an adherent of established
tenets or teachings of such sect or division by reason of which he is
conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any private or public
insurance which makes payments in the event of death, disability, old-age, or
retirement or makes payments toward the cost of, or provides services for,
medical care (including the benefits of any insurance system established by the
Social Security Act). Such exemption may be granted only if the application
contains or is accompanied by-(A) such evidence of such individual's membership in, and adherence to the
tenets or teachings of, the sect or division thereof as the Secretary may require
for purposes of determining such individual's compliance with the preceding
sentence, and
(B) his waiver of all benefits and other payments under titles II and XVIII of the
Social Security Act on the basis of his wages and self-employment income as
well as all such benefits and other payments to him on the basis of the wages
and self-employment income of any other person,
and only if the Commissioner of Social Security finds that-(C) such sect or division thereof has the established tenets or teachings referred
to in the preceding sentence,
2
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(D) it is the practice, and has been for a period of time which he deems to be
substantial, for members of such sect or division thereof to make provision for
their dependent members which in his judgment is reasonable in view of their
general level of living, and
(E) such sect or division thereof has been in existence at all times since
December 31, 1950.
An exemption may not be granted to any individual if any benefit or other
payment referred to in subparagraph (B) became payable (or, but for section
203 or 222(b) of the Social Security Act, would have become payable) at or
before the time of the filing of such waiver.
(2) Period for which exemption effective.--An exemption granted to any
individual pursuant to this subsection shall apply with respect to all taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1950, except that such exemption shall not apply
for any taxable year-(A) beginning (i) before the taxable year in which such individual first met the
requirements of the first sentence of paragraph (1), or (ii) before the time as of
which the Commissioner of Social Security finds that the sect or division
thereof of which such individual is a member met the requirements of
subparagraphs (C) and (D), or
(B) ending (i) after the time such individual ceases to meet the requirements of
the first sentence of paragraph (1), or (ii) after the time as of which the
Commissioner of Social Security finds that the sect or division thereof of which
he is a member ceases to meet the requirements of subparagraph (C) or (D).
(3) Subsection to apply to certain church employees.--This subsection shall
apply with respect to services which are described in subparagraph (B) of section
3121(b)(8) (and are not described in subparagraph (A) of such section).

3
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United States Code Annotated
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code
Subtitle D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Chapter 42. Private Foundations; and Certain Other Tax-Exempt
Organizations
Subchapter D. Failure by Certain Charitable Organizations to
Meet Certain Qualification Requirements
§ 4959. Taxes on failures by hospital organizations
If a hospital organization to which section 501(r) applies fails to meet the
requirement of section 501(r)(3) for any taxable year, there is imposed on the
organization a tax equal to $50,000.
United States Code Annotated Currentness
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 43. Qualified Pension, Etc., Plans (Refs & Annos)
§ 4980H. Shared responsibility for employers regarding health coverage
(a) Large employers not offering health coverage.--If-(1) any applicable large employer fails to offer to its full-time employees
(and their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential
coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored plan (as defined in section
5000A(f)(2)) for any month, and
(2) at least one full-time employee of the applicable large employer has been
certified to the employer under section 1411 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act as having enrolled for such month in a qualified health
plan with respect to which an applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing
reduction is allowed or paid with respect to the employee,
then there is hereby imposed on the employer an assessable payment equal to the
product of the applicable payment amount and the number of individuals employed
by the employer as full-time employees during such month.
4
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(b) Large employers offering coverage with employees who qualify for
premium tax credits or cost-sharing reductions.-(1) In general.--If-(A) an applicable large employer offers to its full-time
employees (and their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in
minimum essential coverage under an eligible employersponsored plan (as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)) for any
month, and
(B) 1 or more full-time employees of the applicable large
employer has been certified to the employer under section 1411
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as having
enrolled for such month in a qualified health plan with respect
to which an applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing
reduction is allowed or paid with respect to the employee,
then there is hereby imposed on the employer an assessable payment equal to the
product of the number of full-time employees of the applicable large employer
described in subparagraph (B) for such month and an amount equal to 1/12 of
$3,000.
(2) Overall limitation.--The aggregate amount of tax determined under
paragraph (1) with respect to all employees of an applicable large employer
for any month shall not exceed the product of the applicable payment
amount and the number of individuals employed by the employer as fulltime employees during such month.
(3) Special rules for employers providing free choice vouchers.--No
assessable payment shall be imposed under paragraph (1) for any month
with respect to any employee to whom the employer provides a free choice
voucher under section 10108 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act for such month.
(c) Definitions and special rules.--For purposes of this section--

5
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(1) Applicable payment amount.--The term “applicable payment amount”
means, with respect to any month, 1/12 of $2,000.
(2) Applicable large employer.-(A) In general.--The term “applicable large employer” means, with
respect to a calendar year, an employer who employed an average of
at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the preceding
calendar year.
(B) Exemption for certain employers.-(i) In general.--An employer shall not be considered to employ
more than 50 full-time employees if-(I) the employer's workforce exceeds 50 full-time
employees for 120 days or fewer during the calendar
year, and
(II) the employees in excess of 50 employed during such
120-day period were seasonal workers.
(ii) Definition of seasonal workers.--The term “seasonal
worker” means a worker who performs labor or services on a
seasonal basis as defined by the Secretary of Labor, including
workers covered by section 500.20(s)(1) of title 29, Code of
Federal Regulations and retail workers employed exclusively
during holiday seasons.
(C) Rules for determining employer size.--For purposes of this
paragraph-(i) Application of aggregation rule for employers.--All persons
treated as a single employer under subsection (b), (c), (m), or
(o) of section 414 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall
be treated as 1 employer.
(ii) Employers not in existence in preceding year.--In the case
of an employer which was not in existence throughout the
6
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preceding calendar year, the determination of whether such
employer is an applicable large employer shall be based on the
average number of employees that it is reasonably expected
such employer will employ on business days in the current
calendar year.
(iii) Predecessors.--Any reference in this subsection to an
employer shall include a reference to any predecessor of such
employer.
(D) Application of employer size to assessable penalties.-(i) In general.--The number of individuals employed by an
applicable large employer as full-time employees during any
month shall be reduced by 30 solely for purposes of
calculating-(I) the assessable payment under subsection (a), or
(II) the overall limitation under subsection (b)(2).
(ii) Aggregation.--In the case of persons treated as 1 employer
under subparagraph (C)(i), only 1 reduction under subclause (I)
or (II) shall be allowed with respect to such persons and such
reduction shall be allocated among such persons ratably on the
basis of the number of full-time employees employed by each
such person.
(E) Full-time equivalents treated as full-time employees.--Solely for
purposes of determining whether an employer is an applicable large
employer under this paragraph, an employer shall, in addition to the
number of full-time employees for any month otherwise determined,
include for such month a number of full-time employees determined
by dividing the aggregate number of hours of service of employees
who are not full-time employees for the month by 120.
(3) Applicable premium tax credit and cost-sharing reduction.--The term
“applicable premium tax credit and cost-sharing reduction” means-7
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(A) any premium tax credit allowed under section 36B,
(B) any cost-sharing reduction under section 1402 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, and
(C) any advance payment of such credit or reduction under section
1412 of such Act.
(4) Full-time employee.-(A) In general.--The term “full-time employee” means, with respect to
any month, an employee who is employed on average at least 30
hours of service per week.
(B) Hours of service.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Secretary of Labor, shall prescribe such regulations, rules, and
guidance as may be necessary to determine the hours of service of an
employee, including rules for the application of this paragraph to
employees who are not compensated on an hourly basis.
(5) Inflation adjustment.-(A) In general.--In the case of any calendar year after 2014, each of
the dollar amounts in subsection (b) and paragraph (1) shall be
increased by an amount equal to the product of-(i) such dollar amount, and
(ii) the premium adjustment percentage (as defined in section
1302(c)(4) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act)
for the calendar year.
(B) Rounding.--If the amount of any increase under subparagraph (A)
is not a multiple of $10, such increase shall be rounded to the next
lowest multiple of $10.
(6) Other definitions.--Any term used in this section which is also used in
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act shall have the same meaning
as when used in such Act.
8
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(7) Tax nondeductible.--For denial of deduction for the tax imposed by this
section, see section 275(a)(6).
(d) Administration and procedure.-(1) In general.--Any assessable payment provided by this section shall be
paid upon notice and demand by the Secretary, and shall be assessed and
collected in the same manner as an assessable penalty under subchapter B of
chapter 68.
(2) Time for payment.--The Secretary may provide for the payment of any
assessable payment provided by this section on an annual, monthly, or other
periodic basis as the Secretary may prescribe.
(3) Coordination with credits, etc.--The Secretary shall prescribe rules,
regulations, or guidance for the repayment of any assessable payment
(including interest) if such payment is based on the allowance or payment of
an applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction with respect to an
employee, such allowance or payment is subsequently disallowed, and the
assessable payment would not have been required to be made but for such
allowance or payment.
[(e) Redesignated (d)]

9
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United States Code Annotated
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code
Subtitle D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Chapter 43. Qualified Pension, Etc., Plans
§ 4980I. Excise tax on high cost employer-sponsored health coverage
(a) Imposition of tax.--If-(1) an employee is covered under any applicable employer-sponsored
coverage of an employer at any time during a taxable period, and
(2) there is any excess benefit with respect to the coverage,
there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 40 percent of the excess benefit.

10
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United States Code Annotated
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code
Subtitle D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Chapter 48. Maintenance of Minimum Essential Coverage
§ 5000A. Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage
(a) Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage.--An applicable
individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the
individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable
individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.
(b) Shared responsibility payment.-(1) In general.--If a taxpayer who is an applicable individual, or an
applicable individual for whom the taxpayer is liable under paragraph
(3), fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more
months, then, except as provided in subsection (e), there is hereby
imposed on the taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures in the
amount determined under subsection (c).
(2) Inclusion with return.--Any penalty imposed by this section with
respect to any month shall be included with a taxpayer's return under
chapter 1 for the taxable year which includes such month.
(3) Payment of penalty.--If an individual with respect to whom a
penalty is imposed by this section for any month-(A) is a dependent (as defined in section 152) of another
taxpayer for the other taxpayer's taxable year including such
month, such other taxpayer shall be liable for such penalty, or
(B) files a joint return for the taxable year including such
month, such individual and the spouse of such individual shall
be jointly liable for such penalty.
(c) Amount of penalty.--

11
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(1) In general.--The amount of the penalty imposed by this section on
any taxpayer for any taxable year with respect to failures described in
subsection (b)(1) shall be equal to the lesser of-(A) the sum of the monthly penalty amounts determined under
paragraph (2) for months in the taxable year during which 1 or
more such failures occurred, or
(B) an amount equal to the national average premium for
qualified health plans which have a bronze level of coverage,
provide coverage for the applicable family size involved, and
are offered through Exchanges for plan years beginning in the
calendar year with or within which the taxable year ends.
(2) Monthly penalty amounts.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(A), the
monthly penalty amount with respect to any taxpayer for any month
during which any failure described in subsection (b)(1) occurred is an
amount equal to 1/12 of the greater of the following amounts:
(A) Flat dollar amount.--An amount equal to the lesser of-(i) the sum of the applicable dollar amounts for all
individuals with respect to whom such failure occurred
during such month, or
(ii) 300 percent of the applicable dollar amount
(determined without regard to paragraph (3)(C)) for the
calendar year with or within which the taxable year ends.
(B) Percentage of income.--An amount equal to the following
percentage of the excess of the taxpayer's household income for
the taxable year over the amount of gross income specified in
section 6012(a)(1) with respect to the taxpayer for the taxable
year:

(i) 1.0 percent for taxable years beginning in 2014.
(ii) 2.0 percent for taxable years beginning in 2015.
12
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(iii) 2.5 percent for taxable years beginning after 2015.
(3) Applicable dollar amount.--For purposes of paragraph (1)-(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and
(C), the applicable dollar amount is $695.
(B) Phase in.--The applicable dollar amount is $95 for 2014 and
$325 for 2015.
(C) Special rule for individuals under age 18.--If an applicable
individual has not attained the age of 18 as of the beginning of a
month, the applicable dollar amount with respect to such
individual for the month shall be equal to one-half of the
applicable dollar amount for the calendar year in which the
month occurs.
(D) Indexing of amount.--In the case of any calendar year
beginning after 2016, the applicable dollar amount shall be
equal to $695, increased by an amount equal to-(i) $695, multiplied by
(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined under
section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year, determined by
substituting “calendar year 2015” for “calendar year
1992” in subparagraph (B) thereof.
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a multiple
of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the next lowest
multiple of $50.
(4) Terms relating to income and families.--For purposes of this
section-(A) Family size.--The family size involved with respect to any
taxpayer shall be equal to the number of individuals for whom
the taxpayer is allowed a deduction under section 151 (relating
13

Case: 10-2347 Document: 10

Date Filed: 01/18/2011

Page: 82

to allowance of deduction for personal exemptions) for the
taxable year.
(B) Household income.--The term “household income” means,
with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable year, an amount
equal to the sum of-(i) the modified adjusted gross income of the taxpayer,
plus
(ii) the aggregate modified adjusted gross incomes of all
other individuals who-(I) were taken into account in determining the
taxpayer's family size under paragraph (1), and
(II) were required to file a return of tax imposed by
section 1 for the taxable year.
(C) Modified adjusted gross income.--The term “modified
adjusted gross income” means adjusted gross income increased
by-(i) any amount excluded from gross income under section
911, and
(ii) any amount of interest received or accrued by the
taxpayer during the taxable year which is exempt from
tax.
[(D) Repealed. Pub.L. 111-152, Title I, § 1002(b)(1), Mar. 30,
2010, 124 Stat. 1032]
(d) Applicable individual.--For purposes of this section-(1) In general.--The term “applicable individual” means, with respect
to any month, an individual other than an individual described in
paragraph (2), (3), or (4).
14
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(2) Religious exemptions.-(A) Religious conscience exemption.--Such term shall not
include any individual for any month if such individual has in
effect an exemption under section 1311(d)(4)(H) of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act which certifies that such
individual is-(i) a member of a recognized religious sect or division
thereof which is described in section 1402(g)(1), and
(ii) an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such
sect or division as described in such section.
(B) Health care sharing ministry.-(i) In general.--Such term shall not include any individual
for any month if such individual is a member of a health
care sharing ministry for the month.
(ii) Health care sharing ministry.--The term “health care
sharing ministry” means an organization-(I) which is described in section 501(c)(3) and is
exempt from taxation under section 501(a),
(II) members of which share a common set of
ethical or religious beliefs and share medical
expenses among members in accordance with
those beliefs and without regard to the State in
which a member resides or is employed,
(III) members of which retain membership even
after they develop a medical condition,
(IV) which (or a predecessor of which) has been in
existence at all times since December 31, 1999,
and medical expenses of its members have been
15
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shared continuously and without interruption since
at least December 31, 1999, and
(V) which conducts an annual audit which is
performed by an independent certified public
accounting firm in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles and which is made
available to the public upon request.
(3) Individuals not lawfully present.--Such term shall not include an
individual for any month if for the month the individual is not a
citizen or national of the United States or an alien lawfully present in
the United States.
(4) Incarcerated individuals.--Such term shall not include an
individual for any month if for the month the individual is
incarcerated, other than incarceration pending the disposition of
charges.
(e) Exemptions.--No penalty shall be imposed under subsection (a) with
respect to-(1) Individuals who cannot afford coverage.-(A) In general.--Any applicable individual for any month if the
applicable individual's required contribution (determined on an
annual basis) for coverage for the month exceeds 8 percent of
such individual's household income for the taxable year
described in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. For purposes of applying this
subparagraph, the taxpayer's household income shall be
increased by any exclusion from gross income for any portion
of the required contribution made through a salary reduction
arrangement.
(B) Required contribution.--For purposes of this paragraph, the
term “required contribution” means--
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(i) in the case of an individual eligible to purchase
minimum essential coverage consisting of coverage
through an eligible-employer-sponsored plan, the portion
of the annual premium which would be paid by the
individual (without regard to whether paid through salary
reduction or otherwise) for self-only coverage, or
(ii) in the case of an individual eligible only to purchase
minimum essential coverage described in subsection
(f)(1)(C), the annual premium for the lowest cost bronze
plan available in the individual market through the
Exchange in the State in the rating area in which the
individual resides (without regard to whether the
individual purchased a qualified health plan through the
Exchange), reduced by the amount of the credit allowable
under section 36B for the taxable year (determined as if
the individual was covered by a qualified health plan
offered through the Exchange for the entire taxable year).
(C) Special rules for individuals related to employees.--For
purposes of subparagraph (B)(i), if an applicable individual is
eligible for minimum essential coverage through an employer
by reason of a relationship to an employee, the determination
under subparagraph (A) shall be made by reference to required
contribution of the employee.
(D) Indexing.--In the case of plan years beginning in any
calendar year after 2014, subparagraph (A) shall be applied by
substituting for „8 percent‟ the percentage the Secretary of
Health and Human Services determines reflects the excess of
the rate of premium growth between the preceding calendar
year and 2013 over the rate of income growth for such period.
(2) Taxpayers with income below filing threshold.--Any applicable
individual for any month during a calendar year if the individual's
household income for the taxable year described in section
1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is
less than the amount of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1)
with respect to the taxpayer.
17
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(3) Members of Indian tribes.--Any applicable individual for any
month during which the individual is a member of an Indian tribe (as
defined in section 45A(c)(6)).
(4) Months during short coverage gaps.-(A) In general.--Any month the last day of which occurred
during a period in which the applicable individual was not
covered by minimum essential coverage for a continuous period
of less than 3 months.
(B) Special rules.--For purposes of applying this paragraph-(i) the length of a continuous period shall be determined
without regard to the calendar years in which months in
such period occur,
(ii) if a continuous period is greater than the period
allowed under subparagraph (A), no exception shall be
provided under this paragraph for any month in the
period, and
(iii) if there is more than 1 continuous period described in
subparagraph (A) covering months in a calendar year, the
exception provided by this paragraph shall only apply to
months in the first of such periods.
The Secretary shall prescribe rules for the collection of the penalty imposed by this
section in cases where continuous periods include months in more than 1 taxable
year.
(5) Hardships.--Any applicable individual who for any month is
determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under
section 1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a hardship with respect to the
capability to obtain coverage under a qualified health plan.
(f) Minimum essential coverage.--For purposes of this section-18
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(1) In general.--The term “minimum essential coverage” means any of
the following:
(A) Government sponsored programs.--Coverage under-(i) the Medicare program under part A of title XVIII of
the Social Security Act,
(ii) the Medicaid program under title XIX of the Social
Security Act,
(iii) the CHIP program under title XXI of the Social
Security Act,
(iv) medical coverage under chapter 55 of title 10, United
States Code, including coverage under the TRICARE
program;
(v) a health care program under chapter 17 or 18 of title
38, United States Code, as determined by the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, in coordination with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services and the Secretary,
(vi) a health plan under section 2504(e) of title 22, United
States Code (relating to Peace Corps volunteers); or
(vii) the Nonappropriated Fund Health Benefits Program
of the Department of Defense, established under section
349 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 10 U.S.C. 1587 note).
(B) Employer-sponsored plan.--Coverage under an eligible
employer-sponsored plan.
(C) Plans in the individual market.--Coverage under a health
plan offered in the individual market within a State.
(D) Grandfathered health
grandfathered health plan.
19
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(E) Other coverage.--Such other health benefits coverage, such
as a State health benefits risk pool, as the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretary,
recognizes for purposes of this subsection.
(2) Eligible employer-sponsored plan.--The term “eligible employersponsored plan” means, with respect to any employee, a group health
plan or group health insurance coverage offered by an employer to the
employee which is-(A) a governmental plan (within the meaning of section
2791(d)(8) of the Public Health Service Act), or
(B) any other plan or coverage offered in the small or large
group market within a State.
Such term shall include a grandfathered health plan described in
paragraph (1)(D) offered in a group market.
(3) Excepted benefits not treated as minimum essential coverage.-The term “minimum essential coverage” shall not include health
insurance coverage which consists of coverage of excepted benefits-(A) described in paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of section 2791
of the Public Health Service Act; or
(B) described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of such subsection if
the benefits are provided under a separate policy, certificate, or
contract of insurance.
(4) Individuals residing outside United States or residents of
territories.--Any applicable individual shall be treated as having
minimum essential coverage for any month-(A) if such month occurs during any period described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 911(d)(1) which is
applicable to the individual, or
20
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(B) if such individual is a bona fide resident of any possession
of the United States (as determined under section 937(a)) for
such month.
(5) Insurance-related terms.--Any term used in this section which is
also used in title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
shall have the same meaning as when used in such title.
(g) Administration and procedure.-(1) In general.--The penalty provided by this section shall be paid
upon notice and demand by the Secretary, and except as provided in
paragraph (2), shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as
an assessable penalty under subchapter B of chapter 68.
(2) Special rules.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law-(A) Waiver of criminal penalties.--In the case of any failure by
a taxpayer to timely pay any penalty imposed by this section,
such taxpayer shall not be subject to any criminal prosecution
or penalty with respect to such failure.
(B) Limitations on liens and levies.--The Secretary shall not-(i) file notice of lien with respect to any property of a
taxpayer by reason of any failure to pay the penalty
imposed by this section, or
(ii) levy on any such property with respect to such
failure.

United States Code Annotated
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code
Subtitle D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Chapter 49. Cosmetic Services
§ 5000B. Imposition of tax on indoor tanning services
21
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(a) In general.--There is hereby imposed on any indoor tanning service a tax
equal to 10 percent of the amount paid for such service (determined without
regard to this section), whether paid by insurance or otherwise.
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United States Code Annotated
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare
Chapter 157. Quality Affordable Health Care for All Americans
Subchapter III. Available Coverage Choices for All Americans
Part A. Establishment of Qualified Health Plans
§ 18022. Essential health benefits requirements
(a) Essential health benefits package
In this chapter, the term “essential health benefits package” means, with
respect to any health plan, coverage that-(1) provides for the essential health benefits defined by the Secretary under
subsection (b);
(2) limits cost-sharing for such coverage in accordance with subsection (c);
and
(3) subject to subsection (e), provides either the bronze, silver, gold, or
platinum level of coverage described in subsection (d).
(b) Essential health benefits
(1) In general
Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary shall define the essential health
benefits, except that such benefits shall include at least the following general
categories and the items and services covered within the categories:
(A) Ambulatory patient services.
(B) Emergency services.
(C) Hospitalization.
(D) Maternity and newborn care.
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(E) Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral
health treatment.
(F) Prescription drugs.
(G) Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices.
(H) Laboratory services.
(I) Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management.
(J) Pediatric services, including oral and vision care.
(2) Limitation
(A) In general
The Secretary shall ensure that the scope of the essential health benefits
under paragraph (1) is equal to the scope of benefits provided under a typical
employer plan, as determined by the Secretary. To inform this
determination, the Secretary of Labor shall conduct a survey of employersponsored coverage to determine the benefits typically covered by
employers, including multiemployer plans, and provide a report on such
survey to the Secretary.
(B) Certification
In defining the essential health benefits described in paragraph (1), and in
revising the benefits under paragraph (4)(H), the Secretary shall submit a
report to the appropriate committees of Congress containing a certification
from the Chief Actuary of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
that such essential health benefits meet the limitation described in paragraph
(2).
(3) Notice and hearing
In defining the essential health benefits described in paragraph (1), and in
revising the benefits under paragraph (4)(H), the Secretary shall provide
notice and an opportunity for public comment.
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(4) Required elements for consideration
In defining the essential health benefits under paragraph (1), the Secretary
shall-(A) ensure that such essential health benefits reflect an appropriate balance
among the categories described in such subsection, so that benefits are not
unduly weighted toward any category;
(B) not make coverage decisions, determine reimbursement rates, establish
incentive programs, or design benefits in ways that discriminate against
individuals because of their age, disability, or expected length of life;
(C) take into account the health care needs of diverse segments of the
population, including women, children, persons with disabilities, and other
groups;
(D) ensure that health benefits established as essential not be subject to
denial to individuals against their wishes on the basis of the individuals' age
or expected length of life or of the individuals' present or predicted
disability, degree of medical dependency, or quality of life;
(E) provide that a qualified health plan shall not be treated as providing
coverage for the essential health benefits described in paragraph (1) unless
the plan provides that-(i) coverage for emergency department services will be provided without
imposing any requirement under the plan for prior authorization of services
or any limitation on coverage where the provider of services does not have a
contractual relationship with the plan for the providing of services that is
more restrictive than the requirements or limitations that apply to emergency
department services received from providers who do have such a contractual
relationship with the plan; and
(ii) if such services are provided out-of-network, the cost-sharing
requirement (expressed as a copayment amount or coinsurance rate) is the
same requirement that would apply if such services were provided innetwork;
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(F) provide that if a plan described in section 18031(b)(2)(B)(ii) of this title
(relating to stand-alone dental benefits plans) is offered through an
Exchange, another health plan offered through such Exchange shall not fail
to be treated as a qualified health plan solely because the plan does not offer
coverage of benefits offered through the stand-alone plan that are otherwise
required under paragraph (1)(J); and
(G) periodically review the essential health benefits under paragraph (1), and
provide a report to Congress and the public that contains-(i) an assessment of whether enrollees are facing any difficulty accessing
needed services for reasons of coverage or cost;
(ii) an assessment of whether the essential health benefits needs to be
modified or updated to account for changes in medical evidence or scientific
advancement;
(iii) information on how the essential health benefits will be modified to
address any such gaps in access or changes in the evidence base;
(iv) an assessment of the potential of additional or expanded benefits to
increase costs and the interactions between the addition or expansion of
benefits and reductions in existing benefits to meet actuarial limitations
described in paragraph (2); and
(H) periodically update the essential health benefits under paragraph (1) to
address any gaps in access to coverage or changes in the evidence base the
Secretary identifies in the review conducted under subparagraph (G).
(5) Rule of construction
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit a health plan from
providing benefits in excess of the essential health benefits described in this
subsection.
(c) Requirements relating to cost-sharing
(1) Annual limitation on cost-sharing
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(A) 2014
The cost-sharing incurred under a health plan with respect to self-only
coverage or coverage other than self-only coverage for a plan year beginning
in 2014 shall not exceed the dollar amounts in effect under section
223(c)(2)(A)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for self-only and
family coverage, respectively, for taxable years beginning in 2014.
(B) 2015 and later
In the case of any plan year beginning in a calendar year after 2014, the
limitation under this paragraph shall-(i) in the case of self-only coverage, be equal to the dollar amount under
subparagraph (A) for self-only coverage for plan years beginning in 2014,
increased by an amount equal to the product of that amount and the premium
adjustment percentage under paragraph (4) for the calendar year; and
(ii) in the case of other coverage, twice the amount in effect under clause (i).
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a multiple of $50, such
increase shall be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50.
(2) Annual limitation on deductibles for employer-sponsored plans
(A) In general
In the case of a health plan offered in the small group market, the deductible
under the plan shall not exceed-(i) $2,000 in the case of a plan covering a single individual; and
(ii) $4,000 in the case of any other plan.
The amounts under clauses (i) and (ii) may be increased by the maximum
amount of reimbursement which is reasonably available to a participant
under a flexible spending arrangement described in section 106(c)(2) of the
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Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (determined without regard to any salary
reduction arrangement).
(B) Indexing of limits
In the case of any plan year beginning in a calendar year after 2014-(i) the dollar amount under subparagraph (A)(i) shall be increased by an
amount equal to the product of that amount and the premium adjustment
percentage under paragraph (4) for the calendar year; and
(ii) the dollar amount under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be increased to an
amount equal to twice the amount in effect under subparagraph (A)(i) for
plan years beginning in the calendar year, determined after application of
clause (i).
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a multiple of $50, such
increase shall be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50.
(C) Actuarial value
The limitation under this paragraph shall be applied in such a manner so as
to not affect the actuarial value of any health plan, including a plan in the
bronze level.
(D) Coordination with preventive limits
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to allow a plan to have a
deductible under the plan apply to benefits described in section 300gg-13 of
this title.
(3) Cost-sharing
In this chapter-(A) In general
The term “cost-sharing” includes-28
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(i) deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, or similar charges; and
(ii) any other expenditure required of an insured individual which is a
qualified medical expense (within the meaning of section 223(d)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986) with respect to essential health benefits
covered under the plan.
(B) Exceptions
Such term does not include premiums, balance billing amounts for nonnetwork providers, or spending for non-covered services.
(4) Premium adjustment percentage
For purposes of paragraphs (1)(B)(i) and (2)(B)(i), the premium adjustment
percentage for any calendar year is the percentage (if any) by which the
average per capita premium for health insurance coverage in the United
States for the preceding calendar year (as estimated by the Secretary no later
than October 1 of such preceding calendar year) exceeds such average per
capita premium for 2013 (as determined by the Secretary).
(d) Levels of coverage
(1) Levels of coverage defined
The levels of coverage described in this subsection are as follows:
(A) Bronze level
A plan in the bronze level shall provide a level of coverage that is designed
to provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to 60 percent of the full
actuarial value of the benefits provided under the plan.
(B) Silver level
A plan in the silver level shall provide a level of coverage that is designed to
provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to 70 percent of the full
actuarial value of the benefits provided under the plan.
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(C) Gold level
A plan in the gold level shall provide a level of coverage that is designed to
provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to 80 percent of the full
actuarial value of the benefits provided under the plan.
(D) Platinum level
A plan in the platinum level shall provide a level of coverage that is
designed to provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to 90 percent of
the full actuarial value of the benefits provided under the plan.
(2) Actuarial value
(A) In general
Under regulations issued by the Secretary, the level of coverage of a plan
shall be determined on the basis that the essential health benefits described
in subsection (b) shall be provided to a standard population (and without
regard to the population the plan may actually provide benefits to).
(B) Employer contributions
The Secretary shall issue regulations under which employer contributions to
a health savings account (within the meaning of section 223 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986) may be taken into account in determining the level
of coverage for a plan of the employer.
(C) Application
In determining under this chapter, the Public Health Service Act, or the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 the percentage of the total allowed costs of
benefits provided under a group health plan or health insurance coverage
that are provided by such plan or coverage, the rules contained in the
regulations under this paragraph shall apply.
(3) Allowable variance
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The Secretary shall develop guidelines to provide for a de minimis variation
in the actuarial valuations used in determining the level of coverage of a plan
to account for differences in actuarial estimates.
(4) Plan reference
In this chapter, any reference to a bronze, silver, gold, or platinum plan shall
be treated as a reference to a qualified health plan providing a bronze, silver,
gold, or platinum level of coverage, as the case may be.
(e) Catastrophic plan
(1) In general
A health plan not providing a bronze, silver, gold, or platinum level of
coverage shall be treated as meeting the requirements of subsection (d) with
respect to any plan year if-(A) the only individuals who are eligible to enroll in the plan are individuals
described in paragraph (2); and
(B) the plan provides-(i) except as provided in clause (ii), the essential health benefits determined
under subsection (b), except that the plan provides no benefits for any plan
year until the individual has incurred cost-sharing expenses in an amount
equal to the annual limitation in effect under subsection (c)(1) for the plan
year (except as provided for in section 300gg-13 of this title); and
(ii) coverage for at least three primary care visits.
(2) Individuals eligible for enrollment
An individual is described in this paragraph for any plan year if the
individual-(A) has not attained the age of 30 before the beginning of the plan year; or
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(B) has a certification in effect for any plan year under this chapter that the
individual is exempt from the requirement under section 5000A of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by reason of-(i) section 5000A(e)(1) of such Code (relating to individuals without
affordable coverage); or
(ii) section 5000A(e)(5) of such Code (relating to individuals with
hardships).
(3) Restriction to individual market
If a health insurance issuer offers a health plan described in this subsection,
the issuer may only offer the plan in the individual market.
(f) Child-only plans
If a qualified health plan is offered through the Exchange in any level of
coverage specified under subsection (d), the issuer shall also offer that plan
through the Exchange in that level as a plan in which the only enrollees are
individuals who, as of the beginning of a plan year, have not attained the age
of 21, and such plan shall be treated as a qualified health plan.
(g) Payments to Federally-qualified health centers
If any item or service covered by a qualified health plan is provided by a
Federally-qualified health center (as defined in section 1396d(l)(2)(B) of this
title) to an enrollee of the plan, the offeror of the plan shall pay to the center
for the item or service an amount that is not less than the amount of payment
that would have been paid to the center under section 1396a(bb) of this title
for such item or service.
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United States Code Annotated Currentness
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare
Chapter 157. Quality Affordable Health Care for All Americans
Subchapter III. Available Coverage Choices for All Americans
Part B. Consumer Choices and Insurance Competition through Health
Benefit Exchanges
§ 18031. Affordable choices of health benefit plans
(a) Assistance to States to establish American Health Benefit Exchanges
(1) Planning and establishment grants
There shall be appropriated to the Secretary, out of any moneys in the Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, an amount necessary to enable the Secretary to make
awards, not later than 1 year after March 23, 2010, to States in the amount
specified in paragraph (2) for the uses described in paragraph (3).
(2) Amount specified
For each fiscal year, the Secretary shall determine the total amount that the
Secretary will make available to each State for grants under this subsection.
(3) Use of funds
A State shall use amounts awarded under this subsection for activities (including
planning activities) related to establishing an American Health Benefit Exchange,
as described in subsection (b).
(4) Renewability of grant
(A) In general
Subject to subsection (d)(4), the Secretary may renew a grant awarded under
paragraph (1) if the State recipient of such grant-(i) is making progress, as determined by the Secretary, toward-(I) establishing an Exchange; and
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(II) implementing the reforms described in subtitles A and C (and the
amendments made by such subtitles); and
(ii) is meeting such other benchmarks as the Secretary may establish.
(B) Limitation
No grant shall be awarded under this subsection after January 1, 2015.
(5) Technical assistance to facilitate participation in SHOP Exchanges
The Secretary shall provide technical assistance to States to facilitate the
participation of qualified small businesses in such States in SHOP Exchanges.
(b) American Health Benefit Exchanges
(1) In general
Each State shall, not later than January 1, 2014, establish an American Health
Benefit Exchange (referred to in this chapter as an “Exchange”) for the State that(A) facilitates the purchase of qualified health plans;
(B) provides for the establishment of a Small Business Health Options Program
(in this chapter referred to as a “SHOP Exchange”) that is designed to assist
qualified employers in the State who are small employers in facilitating the
enrollment of their employees in qualified health plans offered in the small
group market in the State; and
(C) meets the requirements of subsection (d).
(2) Merger of individual and SHOP Exchanges
A State may elect to provide only one Exchange in the State for providing both
Exchange and SHOP Exchange services to both qualified individuals and
qualified small employers, but only if the Exchange has adequate resources to
assist such individuals and employers.
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(c) Responsibilities of the Secretary
(1) In general
The Secretary shall, by regulation, establish criteria for the certification of health
plans as qualified health plans. Such criteria shall require that, to be certified, a
plan shall, at a minimum-(A) meet marketing requirements, and not employ marketing practices or
benefit designs that have the effect of discouraging the enrollment in such plan
by individuals with significant health needs;
(B) ensure a sufficient choice of providers (in a manner consistent with
applicable network adequacy provisions under section 300gg-1(c) of this title of
the Public Health Service Act), and provide information to enrollees and
prospective enrollees on the availability of in-network and out-of-network
providers;
(C) include within health insurance plan networks those essential community
providers, where available, that serve predominately low-income, medicallyunderserved individuals, such as health care providers defined in section
256b(a)(4) of this title and providers described in section 1396r8(c)(1)(D)(i)(IV) of this title, except that nothing in this subparagraph shall be
construed to require any health plan to provide coverage for any specific
medical procedure;
(D)(i) be accredited with respect to local performance on clinical quality
measures such as the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set,
patient experience ratings on a standardized Consumer Assessment of
Healthcare Providers and Systems survey, as well as consumer access,
utilization management, quality assurance, provider credentialing, complaints
and appeals, network adequacy and access, and patient information programs
by any entity recognized by the Secretary for the accreditation of health
insurance issuers or plans (so long as any such entity has transparent and
rigorous methodological and scoring criteria); or
(ii) receive such accreditation within a period established by an Exchange for
such accreditation that is applicable to all qualified health plans;
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(E) implement a quality improvement strategy described in subsection (g)(1);
(F) utilize a uniform enrollment form that qualified individuals and qualified
employers may use (either electronically or on paper) in enrolling in qualified
health plans offered through such Exchange, and that takes into account criteria
that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners develops and
submits to the Secretary;
(G) utilize the standard format established for presenting health benefits plan
options;
(H) provide information to enrollees and prospective enrollees, and to each
Exchange in which the plan is offered, on any quality measures for health plan
performance endorsed under section 280j-2 of this title, as applicable; and
(I) report to the Secretary at least annually and in such manner as the Secretary
shall require, pediatric quality reporting measures consistent with the pediatric
quality reporting measures established under section 1320b-9a of this title.
(2) Rule of construction
Nothing in paragraph (1)(C) shall be construed to require a qualified health plan
to contract with a provider described in such paragraph if such provider refuses to
accept the generally applicable payment rates of such plan.
(3) Rating system
The Secretary shall develop a rating system that would rate qualified health plans
offered through an Exchange in each benefits level on the basis of the relative
quality and price. The Exchange shall include the quality rating in the
information provided to individuals and employers through the Internet portal
established under paragraph (4).
(4) Enrollee satisfaction system
The Secretary shall develop an enrollee satisfaction survey system that would
evaluate the level of enrollee satisfaction with qualified health plans offered
through an Exchange, for each such qualified health plan that had more than 500
enrollees in the previous year. The Exchange shall include enrollee satisfaction
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information in the information provided to individuals and employers through the
Internet portal established under paragraph (5) in a manner that allows
individuals to easily compare enrollee satisfaction levels between comparable
plans.
(5) Internet portals
The Secretary shall-(A) continue to operate, maintain, and update the Internet portal developed
under section 18003(a) of this title and to assist States in developing and
maintaining their own such portal; and
(B) make available for use by Exchanges a model template for an Internet portal
that may be used to direct qualified individuals and qualified employers to
qualified health plans, to assist such individuals and employers in determining
whether they are eligible to participate in an Exchange or eligible for a premium
tax credit or cost-sharing reduction, and to present standardized information
(including quality ratings) regarding qualified health plans offered through an
Exchange to assist consumers in making easy health insurance choices.
Such template shall include, with respect to each qualified health plan offered
through the Exchange in each rating area, access to the uniform outline of
coverage the plan is required to provide under section 300gg-16 of this title and
to a copy of the plan's written policy.
(6) Enrollment periods
The Secretary shall require an Exchange to provide for-(A) an initial open enrollment, as determined by the Secretary (such
determination to be made not later than July 1, 2012);
(B) annual open enrollment periods, as determined by the Secretary for calendar
years after the initial enrollment period;
(C) special enrollment periods specified in section 9801 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 and other special enrollment periods under circumstances similar
to such periods under part D of title XVIII of the Social Security Act; and
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(D) special monthly enrollment periods for Indians (as defined in section 1603
of Title 25).
(d) Requirements
(1) In general
An Exchange shall be a governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is
established by a State.
(2) Offering of coverage
(A) In general
An Exchange shall make available qualified health plans to qualified
individuals and qualified employers.
(B) Limitation
(i) In general
An Exchange may not make available any health plan that is not a qualified
health plan.
(ii) Offering of stand-alone dental benefits
Each Exchange within a State shall allow an issuer of a plan that only
provides limited scope dental benefits meeting the requirements of section
9832(c)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to offer the plan through
the Exchange (either separately or in conjunction with a qualified health plan)
if the plan provides pediatric dental benefits meeting the requirements of
section 18022(b)(1)(J) of this title).
(3) Rules relating to additional required benefits
(A) In general
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), an Exchange may make available a
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qualified health plan notwithstanding any provision of law that may require
benefits other than the essential health benefits specified under section 18022(b)
of this title.
(B) States may require additional benefits
(i) In general
Subject to the requirements of clause (ii), a State may require that a qualified
health plan offered in such State offer benefits in addition to the essential
health benefits specified under section 18022(b) of this title.
(ii) State must assume cost
A State shall make payments-(I) to an individual enrolled in a qualified health plan offered in such State;
or
(II) on behalf of an individual described in subclause (I) directly to the
qualified health plan in which such individual is enrolled;
to defray the cost of any additional benefits described in clause (i).
(4) Functions
An Exchange shall, at a minimum-(A) implement procedures for the certification, recertification, and
decertification, consistent with guidelines developed by the Secretary under
subsection (c), of health plans as qualified health plans;
(B) provide for the operation of a toll-free telephone hotline to respond to
requests for assistance;
(C) maintain an Internet website through which enrollees and prospective
enrollees of qualified health plans may obtain standardized comparative
information on such plans;
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(D) assign a rating to each qualified health plan offered through such Exchange
in accordance with the criteria developed by the Secretary under subsection
(c)(3);
(E) utilize a standardized format for presenting health benefits plan options in
the Exchange, including the use of the uniform outline of coverage established
under section 300gg-15 of this title;
(F) in accordance with section 18083 of this title, inform individuals of
eligibility requirements for the medicaid program under title XIX of the Social
Security Act, the CHIP program under title XXI of such Act, or any applicable
State or local public program and if through screening of the application by the
Exchange, the Exchange determines that such individuals are eligible for any
such program, enroll such individuals in such program;
(G) establish and make available by electronic means a calculator to determine
the actual cost of coverage after the application of any premium tax credit under
section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and any cost-sharing
reduction under section 18071 of this title;
(H) subject to section 18081 of this title, grant a certification attesting that, for
purposes of the individual responsibility penalty under section 5000A of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, an individual is exempt from the individual
requirement or from the penalty imposed by such section because-(i) there is no affordable qualified health plan available through the Exchange,
or the individual's employer, covering the individual; or
(ii) the individual meets the requirements for any other such exemption from
the individual responsibility requirement or penalty;
(I) transfer to the Secretary of the Treasury-(i) a list of the individuals who are issued a certification under subparagraph
(H), including the name and taxpayer identification number of each
individual;
(ii) the name and taxpayer identification number of each individual who was
an employee of an employer but who was determined to be eligible for the
40

Case: 10-2347 Document: 10

Date Filed: 01/18/2011

Page: 109

premium tax credit under section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
because-(I) the employer did not provide minimum essential coverage; or
(II) the employer provided such minimum essential coverage but it was
determined under section 36B(c)(2)(C) of such Code to either be
unaffordable to the employee or not provide the required minimum actuarial
value; and
(iii) the name and taxpayer identification number of each individual who
notifies the Exchange under section 18081(b)(4) of this title that they have
changed employers and of each individual who ceases coverage under a
qualified health plan during a plan year (and the effective date of such
cessation);
(J) provide to each employer the name of each employee of the employer
described in subparagraph (I)(ii) who ceases coverage under a qualified health
plan during a plan year (and the effective date of such cessation); and
(K) establish the Navigator program described in subsection (i).
(5) Funding limitations
(A) No Federal funds for continued operations
In establishing an Exchange under this section, the State shall ensure that such
Exchange is self-sustaining beginning on January 1, 2015, including allowing
the Exchange to charge assessments or user fees to participating health
insurance issuers, or to otherwise generate funding, to support its operations.
(B) Prohibiting wasteful use of funds
In carrying out activities under this subsection, an Exchange shall not utilize
any funds intended for the administrative and operational expenses of the
Exchange for staff retreats, promotional giveaways, excessive executive
compensation, or promotion of Federal or State legislative and regulatory
modifications.
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(6) Consultation
An Exchange shall consult with stakeholders relevant to carrying out the
activities under this section, including-(A) educated health care consumers who are enrollees in qualified health plans;
(B) individuals and entities with experience in facilitating enrollment in
qualified health plans;
(C) representatives of small businesses and self-employed individuals;
(D) State Medicaid offices; and
(E) advocates for enrolling hard to reach populations.
(7) Publication of costs
An Exchange shall publish the average costs of licensing, regulatory fees, and
any other payments required by the Exchange, and the administrative costs of
such Exchange, on an Internet website to educate consumers on such costs. Such
information shall also include monies lost to waste, fraud, and abuse.
(e) Certification
(1) In general
An Exchange may certify a health plan as a qualified health plan if-(A) such health plan meets the requirements for certification as promulgated by
the Secretary under subsection (c)(1); and
(B) the Exchange determines that making available such health plan through
such Exchange is in the interests of qualified individuals and qualified
employers in the State or States in which such Exchange operates, except that
the Exchange may not exclude a health plan-(i) on the basis that such plan is a fee-for-service plan;
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(ii) through the imposition of premium price controls; or
(iii) on the basis that the plan provides treatments necessary to prevent
patients' deaths in circumstances the Exchange determines are inappropriate or
too costly.
(2) Premium considerations
The Exchange shall require health plans seeking certification as qualified health
plans to submit a justification for any premium increase prior to implementation
of the increase. Such plans shall prominently post such information on their
websites. The Exchange shall take this information, and the information and the
recommendations provided to the Exchange by the State under section 300gg94(b)(1) of this title (relating to patterns or practices of excessive or unjustified
premium increases), into consideration when determining whether to make such
health plan available through the Exchange. The Exchange shall take into account
any excess of premium growth outside the Exchange as compared to the rate of
such growth inside the Exchange, including information reported by the States.
(3) Transparency in coverage
(A) In general
The Exchange shall require health plans seeking certification as qualified health
plans to submit to the Exchange, the Secretary, the State insurance
commissioner, and make available to the public, accurate and timely disclosure
of the following information:
(i) Claims payment policies and practices.
(ii) Periodic financial disclosures.
(iii) Data on enrollment.
(iv) Data on disenrollment.
(v) Data on the number of claims that are denied.
(vi) Data on rating practices.
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(vii) Information on cost-sharing and payments with respect to any out-ofnetwork coverage.
(viii) Information on enrollee and participant rights under this title.
(ix) Other information as determined appropriate by the Secretary.
(B) Use of plain language
The information required to be submitted under subparagraph (A) shall be
provided in plain language. The term “plain language” means language that the
intended audience, including individuals with limited English proficiency, can
readily understand and use because that language is concise, well-organized,
and follows other best practices of plain language writing. The Secretary and
the Secretary of Labor shall jointly develop and issue guidance on best practices
of plain language writing.
(C) Cost sharing transparency
The Exchange shall require health plans seeking certification as qualified health
plans to permit individuals to learn the amount of cost-sharing (including
deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance) under the individual's plan or
coverage that the individual would be responsible for paying with respect to the
furnishing of a specific item or service by a participating provider in a timely
manner upon the request of the individual. At a minimum, such information
shall be made available to such individual through an Internet website and such
other means for individuals without access to the Internet.
(D) Group health plans
The Secretary of Labor shall update and harmonize the Secretary's rules
concerning the accurate and timely disclosure to participants by group health
plans of plan disclosure, plan terms and conditions, and periodic financial
disclosure with the standards established by the Secretary under subparagraph
(A).
(f) Flexibility
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(1) Regional or other interstate Exchanges
An Exchange may operate in more than one State if-(A) each State in which such Exchange operates permits such operation; and
(B) the Secretary approves such regional or interstate Exchange.
(2) Subsidiary Exchanges
A State may establish one or more subsidiary Exchanges if-(A) each such Exchange serves a geographically distinct area; and
(B) the area served by each such Exchange is at least as large as a rating area
described in section 300gg(a) of this title.
(3) Authority to contract
(A) In general
A State may elect to authorize an Exchange established by the State under this
section to enter into an agreement with an eligible entity to carry out 1 or more
responsibilities of the Exchange.
(B) Eligible entity
In this paragraph, the term “eligible entity” means-(i) a person-(I) incorporated under, and subject to the laws of, 1 or more States;
(II) that has demonstrated experience on a State or regional basis in the
individual and small group health insurance markets and in benefits
coverage; and
(III) that is not a health insurance issuer or that is treated under subsection
(a) or (b) of section 52 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as a member of
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the same controlled group of corporations (or under common control with)
as a health insurance issuer; or
(ii) the State medicaid agency under title XIX of the Social Security Act.
(g) Rewarding quality through market-based incentives
(1) Strategy described
A strategy described in this paragraph is a payment structure that provides
increased reimbursement or other incentives for-(A) improving health outcomes through the implementation of activities that
shall include quality reporting, effective case management, care coordination,
chronic disease management, medication and care compliance initiatives,
including through the use of the medical home model, for treatment or services
under the plan or coverage;
(B) the implementation of activities to prevent hospital readmissions through a
comprehensive program for hospital discharge that includes patient-centered
education and counseling, comprehensive discharge planning, and post
discharge reinforcement by an appropriate health care professional;
(C) the implementation of activities to improve patient safety and reduce
medical errors through the appropriate use of best clinical practices, evidence
based medicine, and health information technology under the plan or coverage;
(D) the implementation of wellness and health promotion activities; and
(E) the implementation of activities to reduce health and health care disparities,
including through the use of language services, community outreach, and
cultural competency trainings.
(2) Guidelines
The Secretary, in consultation with experts in health care quality and
stakeholders, shall develop guidelines concerning the matters described in
paragraph (1).
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(3) Requirements
The guidelines developed under paragraph (2) shall require the periodic reporting
to the applicable Exchange of the activities that a qualified health plan has
conducted to implement a strategy described in paragraph (1).
(h) Quality improvement
(1) Enhancing patient safety
Beginning on January 1, 2015, a qualified health plan may contract with-(A) a hospital with greater than 50 beds only if such hospital-(i) utilizes a patient safety evaluation system as described in part C of title IX
of the Public Health Service Act; and
(ii) implements a mechanism to ensure that each patient receives a
comprehensive program for hospital discharge that includes patient-centered
education and counseling, comprehensive discharge planning, and post
discharge reinforcement by an appropriate health care professional; or
(B) a health care provider only if such provider implements such mechanisms to
improve health care quality as the Secretary may by regulation require.
(2) Exceptions
The Secretary may establish reasonable exceptions to the requirements described
in paragraph (1).
(3) Adjustment
The Secretary may by regulation adjust the number of beds described in
paragraph (1)(A).
(i) Navigators
(1) In general
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An Exchange shall establish a program under which it awards grants to entities
described in paragraph (2) to carry out the duties described in paragraph (3).
(2) Eligibility
(A) In general
To be eligible to receive a grant under paragraph (1), an entity shall
demonstrate to the Exchange involved that the entity has existing relationships,
or could readily establish relationships, with employers and employees,
consumers (including uninsured and underinsured consumers), or selfemployed individuals likely to be qualified to enroll in a qualified health plan.
(B) Types
Entities described in subparagraph (A) may include trade, industry, and
professional associations, commercial fishing industry organizations, ranching
and farming organizations, community and consumer-focused nonprofit groups,
chambers of commerce, unions, resource partners of the Small Business
Administration, other licensed insurance agents and brokers, and other entities
that-(i) are capable of carrying out the duties described in paragraph (3);
(ii) meet the standards described in paragraph (4); and
(iii) provide information consistent with the standards developed under
paragraph (5).
(3) Duties
An entity that serves as a navigator under a grant under this subsection shall-(A) conduct public education activities to raise awareness of the availability of
qualified health plans;
(B) distribute fair and impartial information concerning enrollment in qualified
health plans, and the availability of premium tax credits under section 36B of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and cost-sharing reductions under section
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18071 of this title;
(C) facilitate enrollment in qualified health plans;
(D) provide referrals to any applicable office of health insurance consumer
assistance or health insurance ombudsman established under section 300gg-93
of this title, or any other appropriate State agency or agencies, for any enrollee
with a grievance, complaint, or question regarding their health plan, coverage,
or a determination under such plan or coverage; and
(E) provide information in a manner that is culturally and linguistically
appropriate to the needs of the population being served by the Exchange or
Exchanges.
(4) Standards
(A) In general
The Secretary shall establish standards for navigators under this subsection,
including provisions to ensure that any private or public entity that is selected as
a navigator is qualified, and licensed if appropriate, to engage in the navigator
activities described in this subsection and to avoid conflicts of interest. Under
such standards, a navigator shall not-(i) be a health insurance issuer; or
(ii) receive any consideration directly or indirectly from any health insurance
issuer in connection with the enrollment of any qualified individuals or
employees of a qualified employer in a qualified health plan.
(5) Fair and impartial information and services
The Secretary, in collaboration with States, shall develop standards to ensure that
information made available by navigators is fair, accurate, and impartial.
(6) Funding
Grants under this subsection shall be made from the operational funds of the
Exchange and not Federal funds received by the State to establish the Exchange.
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(j) Applicability of mental health parity
Section 300gg-26 of this title shall apply to qualified health plans in the same
manner and to the same extent as such section applies to health insurance issuers
and group health plans.
(k) Conflict
An Exchange may not establish rules that conflict with or prevent the application
of regulations promulgated by the Secretary under this subchapter.
CREDIT(S)
(Pub.L. 111-148, Title I, § 1311, Title X, §§ 10104(e) to (h), 10203(a), Mar. 23,
2010, 124 Stat. 173, 900, 927.)
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ERISA SELECTED SECTIONS
United States Code Annotated Currentness
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 18. Employee Retirement Income Security Program (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter I. Protection of Employee Benefit Rights (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle A. General Provisions
§ 1001. Congressional findings and declaration of policy

(a) Benefit plans as affecting interstate commerce and the Federal taxing power
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee
benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational
scope and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the
continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents
are directly affected by these plans; that they are affected with a national public
interest; that they have become an important factor affecting the stability of
employment and the successful development of industrial relations; that they have
become an important factor in commerce because of the interstate character of their
activities, and of the activities of their participants, and the employers, employee
organizations, and other entities by which they are established or maintained; that a
large volume of the activities of such plans are carried on by means of the mails
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce; that owing to the lack of employee
information and adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general
welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be
provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such
plans; that they substantially affect the revenues of the United States because they
are afforded preferential Federal tax treatment; that despite the enormous growth in
such plans many employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated
retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that
owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability
of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be
endangered; that owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have
been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of
anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States, and
to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided
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assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.
(b) Protection of interstate commerce and beneficiaries by requiring disclosure and
reporting, setting standards of conduct, etc., for fiduciaries
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce
and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries,
by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of
financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans,
and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
Federal courts.
(c) Protection of interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and beneficiaries
by vesting of accrued benefits, setting minimum standards of funding, requiring
termination insurance
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate
commerce, the Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants in private
pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the
soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of
employees with significant periods of service, to meet minimum standards of
funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance.
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United States Code Annotated
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare
Chapter 157. Quality Affordable Health Care for All Americans
Subchapter V. Shared Responsibility for Health Care
Part A. Individual Responsibility
§ 18091. Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage
(a) Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In general
The individual responsibility requirement provided for in this section (in this
subsection referred to as the “requirement”) is commercial and economic in
nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of the effects
described in paragraph (2).
(2) Effects on the national economy and interstate commerce
The effects described in this paragraph are the following:
(A) The requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic in
nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is
paid for, and when health insurance is purchased. In the absence of the
requirement, some individuals would make an economic and financial decision
to forego health insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure, which increases
financial risks to households and medical providers.
(B) Health insurance and health care services are a significant part of the
national economy. National health spending is projected to increase from
$2,500,000,000,000, or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to
$4,700,000,000,000 in 2019. Private health insurance spending is projected to
be $854,000,000,000 in 2009, and pays for medical supplies, drugs, and
equipment that are shipped in interstate commerce. Since most health insurance
is sold by national or regional health insurance companies, health insurance is
sold in interstate commerce and claims payments flow through interstate
commerce.
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(C) The requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will add
millions of new consumers to the health insurance market, increasing the supply
of, and demand for, health care services, and will increase the number and share
of Americans who are insured.
(D) The requirement achieves near-universal coverage by building upon and
strengthening the private employer-based health insurance system, which
covers 176,000,000 Americans nationwide. In Massachusetts, a similar
requirement has strengthened private employer-based coverage: despite the
economic downturn, the number of workers offered employer-based coverage
has actually increased.
(E) The economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer
health and shorter lifespan of the uninsured. By significantly reducing the
number of the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other provisions of
this Act, will significantly reduce this economic cost.
(F) The cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured was
$43,000,000,000 in 2008. To pay for this cost, health care providers pass on the
cost to private insurers, which pass on the cost to families. This cost-shifting
increases family premiums by on average over $1,000 a year. By significantly
reducing the number of the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will lower health insurance premiums.
(G) 62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are caused in part by medical
expenses. By significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the
requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will improve
financial security for families.
(H) Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.
1001 et seq.), the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and this
Act, the Federal Government has a significant role in regulating health
insurance. The requirement is an essential part of this larger regulation of
economic activity, and the absence of the requirement would undercut Federal
regulation of the health insurance market.
(I) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health Service Act (as added by
section 1201 of this Act), if there were no requirement, many individuals would
wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care. By significantly
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increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and broaden the
health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower
health insurance premiums. The requirement is essential to creating effective
health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be
sold.
(J) Administrative costs for private health insurance, which were
$90,000,000,000 in 2006, are 26 to 30 percent of premiums in the current
individual and small group markets. By significantly increasing health
insurance coverage and the size of purchasing pools, which will increase
economies of scale, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this
Act, will significantly reduce administrative costs and lower health insurance
premiums. The requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance
markets that do not require underwriting and eliminate its associated
administrative costs.
(3) Supreme Court ruling
In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association (322 U.S. 533
(1944)), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that insurance is interstate
commerce subject to Federal regulation.
CREDIT(S)
(Pub.L. 111-148, Title I, § 1501(a), Title X, § 10106(a), Mar. 23, 2010, 124 Stat.
242, 907.)

55

Case: 10-2347 Document: 10

Date Filed: 01/18/2011

Page: 124

HIPAA Title I Selected Sections
United States Code Annotated
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare
Chapter 6A. Public Health Service
Subchapter XXV. Requirements Relating to Health Insurance Coverage Part A.
Individual and Group Market Reforms
Subpart 1. Portability, Access, and Renewability Requirements
§ 300gg-5. Non-discrimination in health care
(a) Providers
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual
health insurance coverage shall not discriminate with respect to participation under
the plan or coverage against any health care provider who is acting within the
scope of that provider's license or certification under applicable State law. This
section shall not require that a group health plan or health insurance issuer contract
with any health care provider willing to abide by the terms and conditions for
participation established by the plan or issuer. Nothing in this section shall be
construed as preventing a group health plan, a health insurance issuer, or the
Secretary from establishing varying reimbursement rates based on quality or
performance measures.
(b) Individuals
The provisions of section 218c of Title 29 (relating to non-discrimination) shall
apply with respect to a group health plan or health insurance issuer offering group
or individual health insurance coverage.
United States Code Annotated
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare
Chapter 6A. Public Health Service
Subchapter XXV. Requirements Relating to Health Insurance Coverage
Part A. Individual and Group Market Reforms
Subpart 1. Portability, Access, and Renewability Requirements
§ 300gg-6. Comprehensive health insurance coverage
(a) Coverage for essential health benefits package
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A health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual or
small group market shall ensure that such coverage includes the essential health
benefits package required under section 18022(a) of this title.
(b) Cost-sharing under group health plans
A group health plan shall ensure that any annual cost-sharing imposed under the
plan does not exceed the limitations provided for under paragraphs (1) and (2) of
section 18022(c) of this title.
(c) Child-only plans
If a health insurance issuer offers health insurance coverage in any level of
coverage specified under section 18022(d) of this title, the issuer shall also offer
such coverage in that level as a plan in which the only enrollees are individuals
who, as of the beginning of a plan year, have not attained the age of 21.
(d) Dental only
This section shall not apply to a plan described in section 18022(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I) of
this title.
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COBRA TITLE X -- PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
SELECTED SECTIONS
SEC. 10001. EMPLOYERS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE CERTAIN
EMPLOYEES AND FAMILY MEMBERS WITH CONTINUED HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE AT GROUP RATES (INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE AMENDMENTS).
(a) DENIAL OF DEDUCTION FOR EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION TO PLAN.
-- Subsection (i) of section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to
deduction for trade or business expenses with respect to group health plans) is
amended by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3) and by inserting after
paragraph (1) the following new paragraph:
"(2) PLANS MUST PROVIDE CONTINUATION COVERAGE TO
CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS. –
"(A) IN GENERAL. -- No deduction shall be allowed under this section for
expenses paid or incurred by an employer for any group health plan
maintained by such employer unless all such plans maintained by such
employer meet the continuing coverage requirements of subsection (k).
"(B) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN SMALL EMPLOYEES, ETC. -Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any plan described in section
106(b)(2).".
(b) DENIAL OF EXCLUSION FOR HIGHLY COMPENSATED
INDIVIDUALS. -- Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to
contributions by employer to accident and health plans) is amended by inserting
"(a) IN GENERAL. -- " before "Gross" and by inserting at the end thereof
the following new subsection:
"(b) EXCEPTION FOR HIGHLY COMPENSATED INDIVIDUALS
WHERE PLAN FAILS TO PROVIDE CERTAIN CONTINUATION
COVERAGE. –
"(1) IN GENERAL. -- Subsection (a) shall not apply to any amount
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contributed by an employer on behalf of a highly compensated individual
(within the meaning of section 105(h)(5)) to a group health plan maintained
by such employer unless all such plans maintained by such employer meet
the continuing coverage requirements of section 162(k).
***
(c) CONTINUATION COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS. -- Section 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is amended by redesignating subsection (k) as
subsection (l) and by inserting after subsection (j) the following new subsection:
"(k) CONTINUATION COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS OF GROUP
HEALTH PLANS. –
"(1) IN GENERAL. -- For purposes of subsection (i)(2) and section
106(b)(1), a group health plan meets the requirements of this subsection only
if each qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under the plan as a
result of a qualifying event is entitled to elect, within the election period,
continuation coverage under the plan.
*****

SEC. 10002. TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF COVERAGE AT GROUP RATES
FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYEES AND FAMILY MEMBERS (ERISA
AMENDMENTS).

(a) IN GENERAL. -- Subtitle B of title I of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
part:
"PART 6 -- CONTINUATION COVERAGE UNDER GROUP HEALTH
PLANS

"SEC. 601. PLANS MUST PROVIDE CONTINUATION COVERAGE TO
CERTAIN
INDIVIDUALS.
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"(a) IN GENERAL. -- The plan sponsor of each group health plan shall
provide, in accordance with this part, that each qualified beneficiary who
would lose coverage under the plan as a result of a qualifying event is
entitled, under the plan, to elect, within the election period, continuation
coverage under the plan.

SEC. 10003. CONTINUATION OF HEALTH INSURANCE FOR STATE AND
LOCAL EMPLOYEES WHO LOST EMPLOYMENT-RELATED COVERAGE
(PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT AMENDMENTS).
(a) IN GENERAL. -- The Public Health Service Act is amended by adding at the
end the following new title:
"TITLE XXII -- REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN GROUP HEALTH
PLANS FOR CERTAIN STATE
AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES
"SEC. 2201. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL GROUP HEALTH
PLANS MUST PROVIDE CONTINUATION COVERAGE TO CERTAIN
INDIVIDUALS.
"(a) IN GENERAL. -- In accordance with regulations which the Secretary
shall prescribe, each group health plan that is maintained by any State that
receives funds under this Act, by any political subdivision of such a State, or
by any agency or instrumentality of such a State or political subdivision,
shall provide, in accordance with this title, that each qualified beneficiary
who would lose coverage under the plan as a result of a qualifying event is
entitled, under the plan, to elect, within the election period, continuation
coverage under the plan.

PL 99-272, 1986 HR 3128
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